The New Kinship by Cahn, Naomi R.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2012 
The New Kinship 
Naomi R. Cahn 
George Washington University Law School, ncahn@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 Geo. L.J. 367 (2012). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
The New Kinship
NAOMI CAHN*
Over the past century, the Supreme Court has articulated numerous doctrines
that protect family privacy. These doctrines are not, however, well-suited to the
brave new world of families formed through donor eggs, sperm, and embryos.
As the number of donor-conceived children born to same-sex and heterosexual
couples and to single parents increases, and as these families develop connec-
tions to one another, the law has not yet adjusted. This Article provides an
extensive mapping of these “donor-conceived family communities,” and it
reaches two major conclusions that support the development of these new
families. First, relational interests, the traditional focus in family law, should
govern the regulation of the donor world. Second, legal recognition should be
given to the emotional and psychological ties between donor families in order to
provide guidance to the development of donor-conceived family communities.
These two principles point the way to integrating changing social realities into
a new legal framework for donor families, allowing children from the same
donor to connect to one another. While further regulation of relationships has
its dangers, this paradigm shift in the donor world could prompt broader
beneficial changes, creating options beyond framing all families within the
dyadic nuclear-family model.
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INTRODUCTION
The future of the family is one of the central cultural and legal obsessions of
our time. As the courts struggle with the rights to be accorded to same-sex and
transgendered couples, as potential parents hire surrogates to carry their chil-
dren, as divorcing couples fight over “their” embryos, and as cohabitants
successfully claim rights against each other, traditional constructions of the
family have become increasingly subject to challenge.1
The newest challenge to the traditional family comes from the world of
technology. Approximately one million families have been created over the past
1. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177 (2010); Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the
Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236 (2010); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189
(2007).
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half-century through the use of donor sperm or eggs,2 yet legal doctrine has
adjusted slowly to donor-created families. Instead, donor gametes have been
subject to limited regulation within a health law framework, where they are
treated as technological innovations, or within a commercial context, where
they are treated as market transactions rather than as creators of intimacy,
family, and children. Even within family law, the focus is on determining
parentage, focusing on adults’ interests in becoming parents. The law is slow at
adapting to the implications of the technology of assisted reproduction, particu-
larly when donor-conceived offspring look outside of their families to find
others who have used the same donor, forming family communities that are
connected through use of the same donor. The children share genes, but the
families do not share either homes or dependencies. They do often, however,
share intense emotions. As one donor-conceived person reported: “At 27 years
old, finding a brother has been both exciting and a little scary at first. . . . I’m
just so thrilled and anxious for the wonderful times we’ll have together now, the
wonderful family gatherings that have now grown with the inclusion of each
other’s families and friends . . . .”3
This Article proposes a legal basis for the development of these new commu-
nities, exploring what it would mean for the law to consider and support these
different sites for forming familial relationships. There are two different kinds
of new families that are created. First, using third-party gametes creates a new
family member and creates ties between partners, what I label “donor-conceived
families.” Second, using third-party gametes creates genetic relationships be-
tween: (a) the donor and resulting offspring; and (b) all of the offspring
resulting from that donor’s gametes. I label this second category “donor-
conceived and connected family communities” (abbreviated as “donor-
conceived family communities”), and they are the primary focus of this Article.
A series of profound legal changes, ranging from recognition of rights for
alternative families that do not share the same household, to limits on the
anonymity of donor gametes, will result in an approach that is more coherent,
predictable, and defensible than the existing haphazard approach to the regula-
tion of families and communities formed through assisted reproductive technol-
2. No one actually knows how many children have been born through donor sperm and eggs because
of the lack of record-keeping. The estimate used in this Article appears in a variety of sources. See, e.g.,
Colleen Carroll Campbell, Editorial, Children’s Rights Often Overlooked in Today’s Brave New World,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 16, 2009, at A15 (“[There are an] estimated 1 million American children
conceived with the help of sperm donors.”); Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., The Birds and the Bees (via the
Fertility Clinic), N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/31/opinion/31douthat.
html (“About a million American adults, if not more, are the biological children of sperm donors.”).
3. A “Twin” Brother!, DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY (Nov. 26, 2007), http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/
members/ViewSuccess.php?ssID54&seed28244&PHPSESSIDdkjq4bjkb1ihmqn40dqf937823; see
also Randi Mandelbaum, Delicate Balances: Assessing the Needs and Rights of Siblings in Foster Care
To Maintain Their Relationships Post-Adoption, 41 N.M. L. REV. 1 (2011) (exploring laws respecting
sibling relationships).
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ogy (ART).4
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed family law issues and
enunciated a robust doctrine of family privacy,5 donor-conceived family commu-
nities are outside the parameters of this doctrine.6 Recognition of connections
between different donor-conceived families does not involve sexual intimacy
between adults as in the line of cases culminating in Lawrence v. Texas, nor
authority within the parent-child relationship as in Troxel v. Granville, nor the
type of traditional family recognized in Michael H. v. Gerald D., which upheld
the marital presumption notwithstanding strong evidence that the husband was
not the biological father.7 Indeed, donor-conceived family communities contest
traditional assumptions about the state’s role in family law, the goods that the
state should seek to further, and the very definition of family.
Accordingly, this Article sets out a new paradigm for American legal regula-
tion of donor-conceived families and the communities they create by sharing the
same donor. These families and communities might be regulated pursuant to a
4. ART is a general term that refers to a variety of methods for achieving pregnancy by assisted
means. It includes fertility treatments that involve some form of outside intervention, ranging from the
placement of fertilized eggs from the gametes of the intended parents into the mother’s uterus (in vitro
fertilization, or IVF), to using sperm, eggs (gametes), and embryos created by others. See CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 2008 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 3–4 (2010), http://
www.cdc.gov/art/ART2008/PDF/ART_2008_Full.pdf. Although the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) does not include sperm donation in its definition of ART, this Article will include the
practice.
5. See Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010) (holding that father possesses a right of
custody under international law); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 578–79 (2003) (striking down
sodomy law based on individual’s liberty interests); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000)
(plurality opinion) (requiring that “special weight” be given to parents’ preferences); Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 115, 131–32 (1989) (plurality opinion) (upholding constitutionality of marital
presumption of paternity); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207, 234–36 (1972) (allowing Amish
parents to withdraw children from school after eighth grade); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–55
(1972) (extending right to contraception to unmarried individuals); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (upholding fundamental right to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965)
(protecting use of contraceptives by married people); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35
(1925) (protecting, in dicta, parents’ rights to educate their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399, 402–03 (1923) (reversing conviction of teacher who had instructed child in foreign language, in
violation of Nebraska statute, because Fourteenth Amendment protects teacher’s liberty to provide such
instruction).
6. Scholars have addressed some related issues. For example, some scholarship has addressed
parenthood determinations in the reproductive-technology context. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, The
Constitution and the Rights Not To Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135 (2008); Marsha Garrison, Law
Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113
HARV. L. REV. 835 (2000); Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1996, 2052–74 (2003). Others have addressed regulation of the industry. See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein,
Essay, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Timing, Uncertainty, and Donor Anonymity, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 1189 (2010) (reviewing NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS
LEGAL REGULATION (2009)); June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and
Trust: Building Ethical Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
509 (2006); Dov Fox, Note, Racial Classification in Assisted Reproduction, 118 YALE L.J. 1844 (2009).
7. See supra notes 5–6.
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“medical approach” that focuses on the patients (parents) and the fertility clinics
that help them; a contract-based approach that focuses on the intent of the
parents and the donor; or a nuclear-family approach, which might minimize any
deviations from the model of the “standard” family involving one or two
parents and children. Each of these approaches fits well within the existing
laissez-faire system, which contemplates that donors will not want to meet the
children to whom they are genetically related, that intending parents want to
form their own families of choice, and that the children will not want to meet
donors or their “half-siblings,” others who share the same donor. Instead, the
legal regime developed in this Article is based on a holistic family law ap-
proach: intending parents would create families, donors would have the opportu-
nity to meet their children, and offspring would be able to connect with one
another.
The goal of this Article is to map how the protections of constitutional and
family law can be applied to donor family networks specifically. The broader
goal of this Article is to imagine how the traditional rules governing families
should—and should not—translate into rules governing newly developing fam-
ily forms. This Article explores a world in which individuals create affinity
relationships based on shared genes but with few of the other characteristics that
typify the traditional family. By appreciating the differences between family
forms and by recognizing how existing concepts of family neglect quasi-
familial relationships, it becomes possible to see how the constitutional prin-
ciples established for a traditional family might apply in this new environment
to develop respect for new forms of family ties. Considering potential regula-
tion provides an extraordinary opportunity for scholars and policy makers to
create a family law regime where one does not currently exist.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I draws upon social-science literature to
describe the realm of people involved in ART, focusing on those in the
donor-conceived world. The social-science literature confirms that donor-
conceived families are a fast-growing segment of the population, but it also
shows how we, as a society, do not know how to approach these families on
social, linguistic, and legal levels. Many offspring may never learn that they are
donor-conceived nor find out any information about their donors. Part I then
examines how ART creates relationships between families who have used the
same donor, even though the state provides no formal recognition of these
donor-formed “familial” relationships, and, indeed, when it reinforces anonym-
ity, the law hinders the creation of these relationships. Part I uses narratives
from members of these newly formed relationships to show the complexity of
the meaning of “family” and to show the expressed need on the part of some of
these families for guidance.
Part II surveys the few laws that exist in the donor world, turning first to the
varying state approaches to establishing parenthood when third-party gametes
are used, then to laws applicable to the donor. The current scope of law is
confused, and confusing, when it comes to legal rights and obligations in the
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donor-conceived world. While most states have considered the rights of anony-
mous sperm donors, the rights and obligations of “known” donors are not as
clear; moreover, many states have not adapted their laws to consider the rights
of egg donors.
To be sure, the creation of families through assisted reproductive technology
is not entirely sui generis. It has much in common with the creation of families
through adoption,8 and the highly developed legal structure of adoption can
provide some guidance for developing the law of donor families and their
connections.9 Adoption and ART allow families to be created outside of the
traditional biogenetically-related-married-parent-and-child model; the child is
not related to at least one of the legal parents. Moreover, the potentially
conflicting interests between members of the adoption “triad” of birthparents,
adoptive parents, and adopted persons is paralleled by the interests of those who
belong to the ART triad of gamete providers, recipients, and donor-conceived
offspring. Yet the adoption analogy is imprecise. At least rhetorically, adoption
is focused on children and finding families for them; ART is focused on
patients, and on finding treatments for them in a medicalized, consumer-based
model. One donor might create dozens of offspring without ever knowing of
their existence, an unlikely result from one set of birth parents who relinquish a
child for adoption. Donor-conceived individuals have only one birth certificate;
adopted individuals have an original birth certificate, reflecting the names of
their biological parents, and a second, legal birth certificate with the names of
their adoptive parents. And adoption is highly regulated; ART is not. Nonethe-
less, particularly given the amount of planning necessary in the donor parents’
context, the system can bear more regulation, and specifically can bear the sort
of regulation that is imposed on the production of children generally. Society
has long required centralized public records about marriages and births, among
other family events.
In Part III, the Article analyzes, and builds on, three different jurisprudential
strands that create space for legal recognition of donor-conceived family commu-
nities. As the first strand shows, Supreme Court jurisprudence on the family
neither forecloses nor requires recognition of donor-conceived family communi-
ties. A second legal strand challenges the identification of the family with
domesticity; the Article expands this critique to include vertical relationships
between adults and children. It draws on new research in social science concern-
ing the importance of social communities and friendship. The social-science
literature refutes any belief that the law has no role to play in the development
of these families, explaining how the law could facilitate these connections. A
8. For further discussion, see, for example, Naomi Cahn & Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., Old
Lessons for a New World: Applying Adoption Research and Experience to ART, 24 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL L. 1 (2011).
9. Historically, the adoption area has struggled with the equivalence of families formed outside of
biology and families formed through biology. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real
Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077 (2003).
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final legal strand concerns the slowly expanding legal categories of who might
qualify as a parent and demonstrates that changes in conceptions of parenthood
provide an opportunity to recognize alternative parent–offspring relationships.
Next, Part IV analyzes the costs and benefits of different forms of regulation.
First, it considers the application of administrative laws focused on health and
consumer protection. Part IV further considers the utility of existing constitu-
tional jurisprudence on the family. It rejects existing approaches, and then posits
the beginnings of an alternative normative approach by articulating two prin-
ciples to guide the law’s development. First, relational concerns must be
integrated into the existing health-based regulatory system for the donor world.
This challenges both the medical model of donor families and the traditional
family model of domesticated individuals, changing the focus from patient and
home to emotional relationships. New regulation should require keeping track
of the children who result from any particular egg or sperm donor through
government-mandated record-keeping.
Second, in further acknowledgment of the relational issues, the Article advo-
cates legal recognition of these potential families in a nuanced way based on the
various interests of donor-conceived people, their parents, their donors, and the
surrounding culture. The law can implement the patently obvious truth that
families come in different forms, and should be regulated in different ways.
State recognition means creating space for these families to develop. Regardless
of the precise legal basis for such recognition, there are sound policy reasons to
develop new approaches. Although the simple biological relationship need not
entitle members to privileges or state support of the relationships, and though
the Constitution does not necessarily mandate particular kinds of support,
members of these families deserve state regulation for justice and fairness. This
involves facilitating connection between donor-related half-siblings and their
parents where both (or all) persons seek the connection, with more support
where some deeper emotional or caretaking relationship has been established.
Consequently, children must be allowed to find out the identity of their
donors and their biologically related “siblings.” To facilitate this recommenda-
tion, the Article argues for the importance of clarifying, and definitively resolv-
ing, the relationship between donors and the families they help create, a
resolution that will replace the swampy landscape of ambiguous obligations that
currently exists, in which donors cannot be certain that they will have no legal
duties to offspring.10 The Conclusion illustrates how a new jurisprudence of
family connections might affect various foundational normative and jurispruden-
10. Courts have taken inconsistent approaches to the statuses of donors and parents. See, e.g., J.F. v.
W.M. (In re Paternity of M.F. and C.F.), 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (Crone, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that donor agreements, to be enforceable, should
require that sperm be provided to a licensed physician); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1238,
1248 (Pa. 2007) (upholding oral agreement between sperm donor and mother, under which donor
relinquished rights to visitation and mother agreed not to seek child support from the donor); Joslin,
supra note 1, at 1184–87 (discussing judicial and statutory approaches); Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother
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tial positions of family law more broadly.
I. THE WORLD OF DONOR GAMETES
Reproductive technology changes the formation of families, but it need not
challenge laws governing families.11 Families might still consist of intimate
partners, their children, or both, and still need privacy and protection. Nonethe-
less, reproductive technology has enhanced the formation of families that do not
consist of two heterosexual parents and their children, providing opportunities
for single men and women and gay and lesbian couples to bear children. This
Part provides the context for considering further regulation of the donor world.
It describes donor-conceived families and donor-created family communities,
first exploring the population and language of the donor world. It then turns to
research on the meaning of connections within this world.
A. THE POPULATION OF THE DONOR WORLD
When people try to create families using other people’s genetic material, they
can access donor eggs, sperm, or embryos.12 Both donor eggs and embryos
require the involvement of a fertility doctor or clinic, and the patients typically
undergo in vitro fertilization (IVF).13 Infertility has become a huge business,
and the entire ART–donor-gamete industry may top out at nearly $3 billion.14
Sperm donation has been around for centuries, but it has been a fairly secret
practice—the first sperm donors were often medical students, who gave sperm
anonymously.15 In the earliest documented case of sperm donation, the mother
apparently did not even know that her husband’s sperm had not been used.16
Sperm banking today has become a big business, with approximately thirty
sperm banks in the United States.17 California Cryobank, which claims to offer
the largest selection of donors in the sperm industry, has sales of $5–10 million
Should Not Have To Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the
Twenty-first Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 240–44 (2009) (same).
11. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race To Keep Up with Technological
Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 241 (noting that “not every technology generates
litigation and legal scholarship,” although “technological change is often the occasion for legal
problems” (footnote omitted)).
12. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Embryo Fundamentalism, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1015, 1015–16 (2010); Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers,
Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 19–20 (2008).
13. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 3–4, 16.
14. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF
CONCEPTION 3 (2006).
15. RENE ALMELING, SEX CELLS: THE MEDICAL MARKET FOR EGGS AND SPERM 25–27 (2011); DAVID
PLOTZ, THE GENIUS FACTORY: THE CURIOUS HISTORY OF THE NOBEL PRIZE SPERM BANK 165 (2005).
16. See PLOTZ, supra note 15, at 159–60 (describing Dr. William Pancoast’s 1884 case); Anne
Reichman Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and Binding Biology: Seeking AID in the Law, 44 DUKE L.J.
524, 533 n.29 (1994) (same).
17. Jeff Stryker, Regulation or Free Markets? An Uncomfortable Question for Sperm Banks, SCI.
PROGRESS (Nov. 7, 2007), http://www.scienceprogress.org/2007/11/regulation-or-free-markets/.
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per year nationally and internationally.18 Egg donation is far more recent and
needed the birth of the first test-tube baby, Louise Brown, before becoming,
excuse the expression, viable in 1978, but it is a growing practice with an
increasing number of egg-donor agencies.19
In 2008, the latest year for which data are available, there were more than
18,000 cycles using donor eggs or embryos, approximately twelve percent of all
ART procedures performed that year.20 As a result of these procedures, more
than 5,000 babies were born from donations of fresh eggs,21 and perhaps more
than 10,000 donor-egg babies were born in total.22 Far less precise numbers on
sperm-donor babies exist because no entity is responsible for collecting informa-
tion. Although the federal government requires clinics that offer IVF to report
on their use of donor eggs and embryos, no comparable mandate exists for
clinics that use donor sperm; sperm banks are not required to maintain any
records, except those related to safety.23 But it is estimated that 30,000–40,000
children are born each year from donated sperm.24
Indeed, the recruitment of sperm and egg donors is a sophisticated process.25
18. Fox, supra note 6, at 1849.
19. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 203, 212, 220–23 (2009). The sperm business and the egg business are similar in that they
are both selling gametes, but each industry is structured differently. ALMELING, supra note 15.
20. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 60. The CDC explains that “ART
consists of several steps over an interval of approximately 2 weeks,” so “an ART procedure is more
appropriately considered a cycle of treatment rather than a procedure at a single point in time.” Id. at 4
(emphasis omitted).
21. Id. at 63 & fig.49.
22. See id. at 61 fig.47. This estimate is necessarily rough, based on a reading of Figure 47 showing
that perhaps between fifty to seventy percent of the more than 18,000 ART cycles using donor
eggs—fresh or frozen—resulted in live births in 2008.
23. Federal law regulates two aspects of the reproductive technology field: safety of gametes and
clinic success reporting data. NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS
LEGAL REGULATION 53–59 (2009).
24. Tamara Audi, Giving Life: Donor Dads Reach Out to Kids, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 21, 2006,
at A1.
25. See, e.g., Rene Almeling, Gender and the Value of Bodily Goods: Commodification in Egg and
Sperm Donation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at 37, 40, 42–56 (analyzing the “organiza-
tional procedures at contemporary [egg and sperm] donation programs, [and] finding significant
variation in how women’s bodies and men’s bodies are valued”); Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling
Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the Medical Market in Genetic Material, 72 AM. SOC. REV.
319, 320 (2007) [hereinafter Almeling, Selling Genes] (comparing “how staff at commercial fertility
agencies organize the process of egg and sperm donation”); Rene Almeling, “Why Do You Want To Be a
Donor?”: Gender and the Production of Altruism in Egg and Sperm Donation, 25 NEW GENETICS &
SOC’Y 143, 155 (2006) [hereinafter Almeling, “Why Do You Want To Be a Donor?”] (“Donor profiles
are packaged representations, shaped by the donor’s interest in being selected and the agency’s interest
in recruiting clients, and these interests are structured in part by gendered social norms.”); Krawiec,
supra note 19, at 206–07 (arguing that “[o]ne of the defining characteristics of the baby market is . . .
the legal regime’s formal exclusion of [egg donors] from the full profits of exchange,” while “a wide
array of fertility specialists, agents, brokers, facilitators, and other middlemen . . . legally profit
handsomely from the baby market, without similar restrictions on their profit-making activities”); Fox,
supra note 6 (noting and discussing the fact that most sperm banks offer information about donors’
racial characteristics); David Tuller, Payment Offers to Egg Donors Prompt Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May
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Potential purchasers can receive extensive information about the donors, al-
though not all of this information is necessarily accurate.26 Studies of egg
donors have found that they are motivated both by altruism and by financial
needs, although their stories are shaped by egg brokers to emphasize the
altruism.27 Egg donors may feel somewhat unprepared for the short- and
long-term moral, physical, and psychological effects of donation, and a few
former egg donors have called for greater regulation of donation.28 The egg
providers seeking further safeguards in the donor process may express concern
about anonymity and never knowing any children born from their gametes, as
well as the health risks and the lack of disclosure and care.29
Apart from general informed consent to medical procedures, there is no law
requiring that donors receive any specific information about the unknown risks
of egg donation, nor that follow-up health care be provided.30 Moreover, there
are also no limits on the number of children who can be produced as the result
of any individual donor’s gametes. The American Society for Reproductive
Medicine (ASRM), a trade group, has developed recommendations on the
10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/health/11eggs.html (discussing compensation for egg
donors, which “often exceed[s] industry guidelines”).
26. See PLOTZ, supra note 15, at 40–42 (reporting on actual donors, who were not Nobel Prize
recipients, to a reputed Nobel Prize-winner sperm bank); M. Cho & F. Licciardi, Egg Donors
Significantly Under-Report Their Weights, 86 FERTILITY & STERILITY S138 (2006).
27. See A.L. Kalfoglou & J. Gittelsohn, A Qualitative Follow-Up Study of Women’s Experiences with
Oocyte Donation, 15 HUM. REPROD. 798, 800 (2000); Nancy J. Kenney & Michelle L. McGowan,
Looking Back: Egg Donors’ Retrospective Evaluations of Their Motivations, Expectations, and Experi-
ences During Their First Donation Cycle, 93 FERTILITY & STERILITY 455, 456 (2010); Steven R.
Lindheim, Jennie Chase & Mark V. Sauer, Assessing the Influence of Payment on Motivations of
Women Participating as Oocyte Donors, 52 GYNECOLOGIC & OBSTETRIC INVESTIGATION 89, 89, 91 (2001).
The language of altruism is, however, particularly important in the egg world. See, e.g., ALMELING,
supra note 15, at 137, 167–68; Krawiec, supra note 19, at 241–42.
28. See, e.g., Interview with Author Julia Derek, CHICK LIT BOOKS, http://chicklitbooks.com/author-
interviews/interview-with-author-julia-derek/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2011); see also JULIA DEREK, CONFES-
SIONS OF A SERIAL EGG DONOR (2004) (portraying the limitations of the current system, from the
perspective of an egg donor); Kenney & McGowan, supra note 27, at 464 (reporting on donors’ lack of
awareness of the physical risks involved in donation).
29. See DEREK, supra note 28; Kenney & McGowan, supra note 27, at 464 (“Additional research is
needed on the efficacy of various means of communicating to donors the short-term physical side
effects that may accompany ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval.”); Alana S., Debt and Donation,
FAMILYSCHOLARS.ORG (May 13, 2010, 5:38 PM), http://familyscholars.org/2010/05/13/debt-and-
donation/ (listing “some things” an egg donor is “angry about”). The American Society for Reproduc-
tive Medicine has developed guidelines for informed consent. See Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for
Reprod. Med. & Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech., 2008 Guidelines for Gamete
and Embryo Donation: A Practice Committee Report, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY S30, S40 (2008). But
see Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, Compensation, and the Ethical Recruitment of Oocyte Donors,
40 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25, 35 (2010) (finding that “[t]he majority of advertisements identified in a
unique national sample of oocyte donor recruitment advertisements complied with ASRM guidelines
[on the compensation of oocyte donors], but a substantial minority did not”).
30. See, e.g., Justine Durrell, Women’s Eggs: Exceptional Endings, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 187,
189–90 (2011); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 916 (1994); Sonia
M. Suter, Giving In to Baby Markets: Regulation Without Prohibition, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217,
244 (2009).
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number of babies born with one donor’s gametes, but these are not binding,31
and there are stories of men who have contributed their sperm to produce
dozens of children.32
Embryo donation involves a much smaller group, producing only about 400
live births per year.33 Studies of those who donate their embryos show a variety
of considerations influence their decisions, with patients who ascribe a high
moral status to embryos more likely to donate to others.34
More information is available on the people who use donor gametes. About
eight percent of women will seek some type of infertility services during their
lifetimes.35 Couples may need donor gametes when one of them is medically
infertile and unable to produce viable eggs or sperm; single people and gay and
lesbian couples need donor gametes because they are socially infertile and have
no other source for the gamete. The vast majority of donated eggs are provided
to older women;36 fewer than ten percent of all IVF cycles in women younger
than thirty-nine use donor eggs, with the percentages increasing until more than
fifty percent of all cycles in women ages forty-five and older involve donor
eggs.37 Advances in reproductive technology concerning the manipulation of
sperm have resulted in a decrease of male-factor infertility.38 Although no
31. See Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Repetitive Oocyte Donation, 90
FERTILITY & STERILITY S194, S194–95 (2008); Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med. &
Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech., supra note 29, at S35–36. The ASRM
suggests “an arbitrary limit of no more than 25 pregnancies per sperm or oocyte donor, in a population
of 800,000.” Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra, at S194.
32. E.g., Susan Donaldson James, Confessions of a Sperm Donor: Hundreds of Kids, ABC NEWS
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/sperm-donors-admit-fathering-hundreds-children-call-
regulation/story?id11431918; Rick Montgomery, Through the Web, Kids of Sperm-Donor Dads
Connect with Siblings, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 27, 2009, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705293478/
Through-the-Web-kids-of-sperm-donor-dads-connect-with-siblings.html; Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm
Donor, 150 Offspring, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/health/
06donor.html?pagewantedall; Ginger Adams Otis, Pro Creators: Sperm Donors Dads to Dozens,
N.Y. POST, June 19, 2011, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/sperm_donors_dads_to_dozens_
BPI3xZiOl4sQMpaqcolLkN.
33. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Extra Embryos Pose Dilemma, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/06/wetzstein-extra-embryos-pose-dilemma/. For discus-
sions of patients’ approaches to their excess embryos, see, for example, Robert D. Nachtigall et al.,
What Do Patients Want? Expectations and Perceptions of IVF Clinic Information and Support
Regarding Frozen Embryo Disposition, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2069 (2010).
34. Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Fertility Patients’ Views About Frozen Embryo Disposition: Results
of a Multi-institutional U.S. Survey, 93 FERTILITY & STERILITY 499, 503, 506 (2010).
35. ANJANI CHANDRA ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., FERTILITY, FAMILY PLANNING, AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH OF U.S. WOMEN: DATA FROM THE 2002
NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 137 tbl.98 (2005), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/
sr23_025.pdf.
36. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 60 & fig.46.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE: HOW ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IS CHANGING MEN,
WOMEN, AND THE WORLD 61–74 (2007). Male factor infertility is due to male fertility problems, such as
too few sperm or misshapen sperm. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., PATIENT FACT SHEET: DIAGNOSTIC
TESTING FOR MALE FACTOR INFERTILITY (2008), http://www.sart.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/
Resources/Patient_Resources/Fact_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/Testing_Male-Fact.pdf; Infertility FAQ’s,
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reliable records exist on the use of donor sperm, estimates are that single
women or lesbians constitute the majority of those who purchase sperm,39
although heterosexual men continue to need access to donor sperm.40
Several reasons account for the growth of the fertility industry and the
increasing use of infertility services. First, the reproductive technology industry
is becoming more sophisticated, offering expanded services.41 Second, the
growth is also due to higher demand. The average age of first birth is rising for
the country as a whole.42 At the same time, women’s fertility declines with age:
by age thirty, most women retain only twelve percent of their original egg
reserves, and by age forty just three percent.43 Three percent may still be on
average 9,000 eggs—more than enough to get pregnant—but the odds definitely
change.44
The deferral of childbearing is one aspect of a changing family structure that
is part of the second demographic transition.45 Women—and men—are adjust-
ing to a new family model geared for the postindustrial economy.46 This new
culture, what June Carbone and I have labeled the “Blue Family” model,
emphasizes the importance of women’s as well as men’s workforce participa-
tion, more egalitarian gender roles, and delay of marriage and childbearing until
both parents reach emotional maturity and financial self-sufficiency. With fertil-
ity rates dropping and the average age of marriage moving into the late
twenties, this culture deregulates sexuality, identifies responsibility with finan-
cial independence, respects equality and autonomy, and safeguards access to
contraception and abortion for teens and adults. The “Red Family” model, or
more accurately, the politicians and ministers who have pushed a “moral
values” agenda, rejects the new culture. As a result of this model’s emphasis on
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/Infertility/
index.htm (last updated June 28, 2011).
39. Cheryl Miller, Donated Generation, NEW ATLANTIS, Summer 2008, at 27, 32 (estimating fifty-five
percent).
40. There is a healthy Internet community of dads who are raising donor-inseminated offspring. See,
e.g., DI Dads, Yahoo! Groups, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/di_dads/ (last visited May 31, 2011)
(group for fathers); LIFE AS DAD TO DONOR INSEMINATION (DI) KIDS, http://di-dad.blogspot.com/ (last
visited Feb. 4, 2011) (blog by father).
41. See, e.g., PLOTZ, supra note 15 (discussing the development of increasingly sophisticated sperm
banks); SPAR, supra note 14, at 17–67 (discussing the historical development of various fertility
techniques ranging from hormones to egg donation).
42. T.J. MATHEWS & BRADY E. HAMILTON, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., DELAYED CHILDBEARING: MORE WOMEN ARE HAVING THEIR FIRST CHILD LATER IN LIFE 1–4
(2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db21.pdf.
43. Carolyn Butler, Ovaries Have Not Adjusted to Many Women’s Decision To Delay Having
Children, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/
22/AR2010022203639.html.
44. See Comm. on Gynecologic Practice of the Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists &
Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Age-Related Fertility Decline: A Committee
Opinion, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY S154, S154 (2008).
45. NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES v. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE
CREATION OF CULTURE 34–37 (2010).
46. See id. The Red–Blue paradigm is an ideological construct that helps explain behavioral patterns.
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chastity and due to the lesser availability of contraception and abortion, how-
ever, the red culture is typified by higher teen pregnancy rates, more shotgun
marriages, and lower average ages of marriage and first births.
In those parts of the country where the most fertility clinics are located,
women are more likely to be part of the Blue Family model: they marry and
have children at older ages.47 While infertility is actually higher among women
without a college education,48 they are less likely and able to seek higher tech
interventions because of the cost.49 Even in Massachusetts, a state with man-
dated insurance coverage, the majority of women accessing such care are white,
highly educated, and wealthier.50 A state’s income predicts the availability of
infertility services; availability is correlated with utilization of those services;
and a state’s educational levels directly predict utilization.51
B. THE LANGUAGE OF THE DONOR WORLD
The donor world is also characterized by its own language, where words have
distinct meanings. The language serves as a cultural clue (and cue) to our
interpretation and understanding of these transactions; our beliefs about what is
legally appropriate are affected by our cultural framing of these activities.52
These linguistic tropes show just what is at stake in considering how the state
47. See Ajay K. Nangia, Donald S. Likosky & Dongmei Wang, Access to Assisted Reproductive
Technology Centers in the United States, 93 FERTILITY & STERILITY 745, 747–54 (2010).
48. Tarun Jain, Socioeconomic and Racial Disparities Among Infertility Patients Seeking Care, 85
FERTILITY & STERILITY 876, 879 (2006) (“[W]omen with and without a high school diploma had a higher
prevalence of infertility than women with a bachelor’s degree or higher (8.1%, 8.5%, and 5.6%,
respectively).”). Infertility is typically defined as the failure to become pregnant within a year of
ceasing to use contraceptives. E.g., CHANDRA ET AL., supra note 35, at 22.
49. See Jain, supra note 48, at 876–78.
50. Tarun Jain & Mark D. Hornstein, Disparities in Access to Infertility Services in a State with
Mandated Insurance Coverage, 84 FERTILITY & STERILITY 221, 222 (2005). The pattern is similar in
states that require insurance plans to cover IVF treatment. Mark P. Connolly, Stijn Hoorens & Georgina
M. Chambers, The Costs and Consequences of Assisted Reproductive Technology: An Economic
Perspective, 16 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 603, 607 (2010); Jain, supra note 48, at 876–78; Mary Lyndon
Shanley & Adrienne Asch, Involuntary Childlessness, Reproductive Technology, and Social Justice:
The Medical Mask on Social Illness, 34 SIGNS 851, 856–57, 860 (2009); see also Fox, supra note 6, at
1853 (explaining that the underrepresentation of African-American sperm donors is a result of the
higher proportion of whites who use assisted reproduction).
51. Ahmad O. Hammoud et al., In Vitro Fertilization Availability and Utilization in the United
States: A Study of Demographic, Social, and Economic Factors, 91 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1630,
1633–34 (2009).
52. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sticky Intuitions and the Future of Sexual Orientation Discrimi-
nation, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1388–1404 (2010) (describing how “intuitions . . . are . . . largely respon-
sible for ongoing decisions to sustain legal distinctions based on sexual orientation”); Dan M. Kahan,
The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 153–54 (2007) (“[W]e cannot, as a cognitive
matter, justify laws on grounds that are genuinely free of our attachments to competing understandings
of the good life.”); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 149, 155–56 (2006) (explaining how “[p]erceptions of how harmful activities are . . .
informed by the visceral reactions those activities trigger,” reactions which are “determined largely by
cultural values”); Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in
Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 802–04 (2010) (discussing “the contribution
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should approach these relationships.
First, consider how to describe the family members involved with donor
gametes. Are the children “donor-conceived offspring”? “Donor adoptees”?53
Are the parents “donor-conceived parents”? Are people born from the same
donor’s gametes strangers or siblings? Are the donors parents?54 Donor-
conceived offspring who share a gamete provider are often referred to as
“half-siblings,” rather than (the more awkward) “individuals who share genetic
material.”55 Phrasing a connection in familial terms, such as sibling, rather than
biological terms, such as shared genetic material, already suggests the appropri-
ate legal and cultural frameworks.56
Second, ART covers a variety of techniques that do not necessarily involve
donor gametes; in vitro fertilization is most commonly performed using the
patients’ own gametes. Should the donor world instead be referred to as
third-party reproduction and subject to separate regulations? And perhaps artifi-
cial insemination might better be labeled as “alternative insemination,” recogniz-
ing that many consumers are lesbians.57
Third, consider the use of the word “donor.” What has the donor actually
donated? Goods or services?58 More importantly, sperm and egg donors are, in
most cases, actually sperm and egg sellers, although some gamete providers are
thatcultural cognition makes to the controversy over how the law should respond to acquaintance
rape”).
53. See, e.g., ROBIN L. BENNETT, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE GENETIC FAMILY HISTORY 245 (2d ed.
2010); CAROLINE LORBACH, EXPERIENCES OF DONOR CONCEPTION: PARENTS, OFFSPRING AND DONORS THROUGH
THE YEARS 167 (2003).
54. See Lawrie McFarlane, Donor Case Strikes at Basic Family Foundations, TIMES COLONIST
(Victoria), July 15, 2011, http://www2.canada.com/victoriatimescolonist/news/comment/story.html
?id7074bc86-6d1a-41b5-b6e2-e3da99ec38d3&p1 (“The contemporary fixation with searching for a
‘biological parent’ . . . gives the animal act of reproduction equal standing with human values like
devotion and caring.”).
55. E.g., A Guide to the World of Donor Conception: Information for Donors, Parents and
Donor-Conceived People, DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY 9–10, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/files/6612/
9183/5956/DSR_Brochure_Final.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2011) (recounting one donor-conceived per-
son’s “Story of Half-Siblings”).
56. See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT! KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE
DEBATE, at xv (2004) (“Frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world. As a result,
they shape the goals we seek . . . and what counts as a good or bad outcome of our actions. In politics
our frames shape our social policies and the institutions we form to carry out policies.”); Amy
Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117
YALE L.J. 804, 814 (2008) (“Each frame is socially mediated, which is to say, each act of framing
represents a process of interpretation that takes place between rather than strictly within individuals.”).
57. See Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory
of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 n.5 (2003).
58. See MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 160–61 (2006).
There is also a robust scholarly discussion of seller liability. E.g., J. Brad Reich & Dawn Swink, You
Can’t Put the Genie Back in the Bottle: Potential Rights and Obligations of Egg Donors in the
Cybperprocreation Era, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 43–64 (2010) (analyzing the applicability of
contract and tort principles to the egg market); Fox, supra note 6, at 1895–97 (suggesting the possibility
of sperm banks’ liability under antidiscrimination statutes for classifying donors according to race).
Although this Article generally uses the term “donor” to refer to the individual who has provided the
third-party gametes, this label reflects convenience, rather than conviction. More accurate terminology
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not paid for their contributions. As in many other areas of family law, commer-
cialization and commodification exist here,59 even though, like baby selling or,
perhaps, prostitution, a relationship is being created.60 It may certainly be
appropriate to sell gametes, but the language should reflect what actually
happens, rather than trying to shape perceptions.61
Indeed, the practice is controlled by the image of charitable gametic contribu-
tions.62 Consider the mixed messages on charity and commodification in the
following advertisement for a donor: “‘21-year-old Chinese MIT student with A
grade-point average, 1500 SAT score, several awards in high school and
university,’ and with a desire to ‘help bring a child into the world with the same
special gifts she has.’”63 The woman meeting these criteria would be paid
$35,000.64
Finally, perhaps the most problematic issue concerns the meaning of “family”
in this context. The word “family” connotes certain culturally-iconic images:
interdependence, emotional intimacy, sharing a home, and kinship based on
blood or legally recognized affinities, with the law keeping its distance by
respecting the private nature of these relationships. The law is, nonetheless,
integrally involved in constructing families by defining who can marry whom
(from same-sex couples to sixteen-year-olds), assigning parenthood and identify-
ing the father and mother, determining who can make decisions on behalf of a
child, establishing when parental rights can and should be terminated, as well as
by providing legal protections for the privacy of relationships defined as
families,65 protections for family members based on their status,66 and a struc-
ture to allocate decision making with respect to the parent, child, and state.
would reflect the differing roles that the third-party-gamete provider plays in the lives of the intending
parents and donor-conceived people.
59. See Ertman, supra note 57, at 11–12; Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs:
Price-Fixing in the Gamete Market, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at 59, 84–85; Debora Spar
& Anna M. Harrington, Building a Better Baby Business, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 41, 60–62 (2009).
60. See Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809,
845–47 (2010) (“[T]here are . . . often emotional connections between sex workers and their clients.”).
61. Sociologist Rene Almeling discusses how the language influences the perceptions of the donors
themselves. ALMELING, supra note 15, at 110–41.
62. See Almeling, Selling Genes, supra note 25, at 326; Almeling, “Why Do You Want To Be a
Donor?,” supra note 25, at 154–55.
63. Laura Crimaldi, Cali. Couple Seeks Egg-ceptional Donor, BOS. HERALD, Jan. 25, 2009, available
at 2009 WLNR 1516873.
64. Id. The language of altruism may also be gendered. While both sperm and egg donors are
initially interested in the financial compensation, agencies reinforce altruism for egg donors, and the
work aspects for sperm donors. See ALMELING, supra note 15, at 112, 125. Almeling notes that “in egg
agencies donation means giving a gift while in sperm banks donation means performing a job.” Id. at
53.
65. See Laura T. Kessler, New Frontiers in Family Law: Introduction, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 275, 275,
11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 227, 227 (2009) (noting “the state[’s] . . . role in privileging certain families over
others”); Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 60, at 826 n.98 (noting the constitutional protection
afforded to “family-like relationships”).
66. See DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 3 (2009).
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Even familial relationships that seem to be “outside” of the law are defined by
reference to the law.
Janet Dolgin has marvelously provided a preliminary legal exploration of
“donor families,” arguing that these families show that assumptions concerning
the formation of families by choice are problematic in this era of biologically
determined families.67 Indeed, one of the many fascinating things about donor-
conceived families is the complexity and intertwined “nature” of biology and
choice: individuals choose to become parents by selecting someone whose
biological background they feel comfortable with by engaging in extensive
investigation of potential donors,68 and then they, and their offspring, choose (or
not) to track down others who share the same biological background.
Ultimately, using the language of family and altruism as framing devices
suggests the applicability of existing family laws. The notion of a donor implies
some kind of connection;69 contrast the connotation with “gamete provider” and
“product.” But this may simply be the tail wagging the dog. If family law
applies, then this leads to a series of additional issues concerning the role of
law, such as whether the law should define the family or let the ascribed
meanings that individuals make control, without specific laws addressing the
situation; whether individuals should be able to decide on the rights to accord a
donor or whether there should be an override law; and how to account for the
multiple, potentially conflicting relational interests of all members of the differ-
ing families. These are issues raised by the donor world, but not yet resolved,
and they provide the framework for subsequent sections of the Article.
C. DONOR-CONCEIVED FAMILY COMMUNITIES
The increasing use of donor sperm and eggs has created hundreds of thou-
sands of families. As parents explain the facts of conception to their children, as
the children understand that they may be related—biologically—to numerous
potential half-siblings, donor offspring and their parents have begun to search
for those with shared gametes and to advocate for disclosure of donor identities.
Thousands of people have begun to “use the Internet to expand their kinship
circle” and to create what they often think of as a “unique extended family” in
which they are “raising children who are far-flung and yet intimately related.”70
Wendy Kramer and Ryan Kramer, her donor-conceived son, who together
started the Donor Sibling Registry (DSR) in 2000, have facilitated contact
67. Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 AKRON L. REV. 347,
396–97 (2008) (“[F]orms of family that have emerged in the last several decades are generally seen as
having discarded or downplayed the notion that biological relationship is or should be central to
definitions of family. The presumptive form of the modern family in the U.S.—the family of choice—
has received significant attention . . . .”).
68. See Jennifer Egan, Wanted: A Few Good Sperm, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 19, 2006, http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/magazine/319dad.html. For a pop-culture commentary on this phenom-
enon, see THE BACK-UP PLAN (CBS Films 2010).
69. See ALMELING, supra note 15, at 12–13.
70. MUNDY, supra note 38, at 169.
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among more than 8,500 genetically related people, including donors and half-
siblings.71 The sperm banks themselves have recognized this growing interest in
connection. For example, California Cryobank has established a “Sibling Regis-
try” that is designed “for clients and their adult children who are interested in
extending their ‘family circle,’” to help in identifying “potential siblings.”72
Moreover, sperm banks are increasingly offering the option of open-identity
donation to allow for donor identification once offspring reach the age of
eighteen.73
Parents and offspring, as well as donors, may all search for one another.74
While comparatively little research has been done in this area, as the secrecy
surrounding use of donor gametes dissolves and as genetic testing becomes
more sophisticated, more will become possible. The studies that do exist
indicate a variety of reasons that members of donor-conceived families search
for donors and for other offspring with the same genetic heritage, and that
donors search for their offspring.75 For example, one survey of almost 600
people who were members of the Single Mothers by Choice organization found
that slightly less than two-thirds wanted their “child to have the possibility of a
larger extended family,” and half were interested in developing a relationship
with other children who shared the donor’s genes.76 Higher levels of searching
seem to be associated with households without fathers,77 perhaps because not
only are children in those families more likely to know of their donor-conceived
71. DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com (last visited June 14, 2011).
72. California Cryobank Fact Sheet, CALIFORNIA CRYOBANK, http://www.cryobank.com/About-Us/
Media-Inquiries/Online-Media-Kit/Fact-Sheet/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
73. See Andrea Mechanick Braverman, How the Internet Is Reshaping Assisted Reproduction: From
Donor Offspring Registries to Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 477,
485 (2010).
74. There are numerous Internet sites with entries from parents, offspring, and donors, see supra
notes 40, 70–71 and accompanying text, as well as an active Facebook group with postings from
members of the donor-conceived community and media inquiries, Donor Conceived Offspring, Sib-
lings, Parents—(Sperm or Egg), FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/groups/6686905255/ (last visited
Aug. 24, 2011) (log-in required).
75. One small study found that the main reasons that parents searched was curiosity about similari-
ties in appearance and personality, and because they wanted to give their child a better sense of identity.
See Joanna E. Scheib & Alice Ruby, Contact Among Families Who Share the Same Sperm Donor, 90
FERTILITY & STERILITY 33, 36–37 (2008) (finding that one of parents’ primary motivations for seeking
donor siblings was to “create family—not for them, but for their children”). Some parents also
indicated that they were interested in finding people who were in a similar situation as themselves. Id.
at 37. While heterosexual couples were the least likely to participate in the option of matching, single
mothers were disproportionately more likely to be involved. Id. at 38. The authors hypothesized that,
for this latter group, contact was a way of creating family. Id. For further discussion of these studies,
see, for example, Naomi Cahn, No Secrets: Openness and Donor-Conceived “Half-Siblings,” 39 CAP.
U. L. REV. 313, 329–39 (2011).
76. Rosanna Hertz & Jane Mattes, Donor-Shared Siblings or Genetic Strangers: New Families,
Clans, and the Internet, 20 J. FAM. ISSUES 1, 5–7 & tbl.1 (2011).
77. See Tabitha Freeman, Vasanti Jadva, Wendy Kramer & Susan Golombok, Gamete Donation:
Parents’ Experiences of Searching for Their Child’s Donor Siblings and Donor, 24 HUM. REPROD. 505,
514 (2009).
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status, but also because of the parents’ openness78 and desire to create larger
communities for their children.79
Donor offspring may feel that part of their heritage is missing. Donor
children may experience a sense of loss for not having information about their
biological pasts or being able to establish a relationship with their gamete
provider, analogous to the experience of “genetic bewilderment” reported by
some adopted children.80 In one of the first studies to compare donor-conceived
offspring to adoptees to biological children, the researchers found that approxi-
mately one-third of the respondents “strongly” agreed, and another one-third
“somewhat” agreed that “[m]y sperm donor is half of who I am.”81 Similar
percentages wondered about their donor’s family.82 And many were interested
in knowing about their ethnic or national backgrounds.83 Compared to adoptees
and offspring biologically related to both parents, the donor-conceived were
disproportionately likely to feel confused when it came to identifying members
of their families and to feel that they could “depend on” their friends more than
78. While heterosexual families can create an “as-if” family, single parents and lesbians clearly do
not comply with traditional cultural expectations of what constitutes a family. For example, in 1968, in
his study of social attitudes towards the family, the famed anthropologist David Schneider was able to
proclaim that Americans define “my family” as “a unit which contains a husband and wife and their
child or children.” DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 30 (1968).
79. See Freeman et al., supra note 77; Scheib & Ruby, supra note 75.
80. E.g., Amanda J. Turner & Adrian Coyle, What Does It Mean To Be a Donor Offspring? The
Identity Experiences of Adults Conceived by Donor Insemination and the Implications for Counselling
and Therapy, 15 HUM. REPROD. 2041, 2050 (2000). More recently, in the largest study to date of donor
offspring (741 in total), with about half of the respondents coming from the general public, eighty-two
percent of respondents indicated the desire to someday be in contact with their donor. Top reasons for
searching were “[c]urious about donors’ looks” and “[t]o learn about [my] ancestry.” Diane Beeson,
Patricia Jennings & Wendy Kramer, Offspring Searching for Their Sperm Donors: How Family Type
Shapes the Process, 26 HUM. REPROD. 2415, 2417–20 & tbl.4 (2011).
81. ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, NORVAL D. GLENN & KAREN CLARK, MY DADDY’S NAME IS DONOR: A NEW
STUDY OF YOUNG ADULTS CONCEIVED THROUGH SPERM DONATION 21, 88 (2010), http://www.familyscholars.
org/assets/Donor_FINAL.pdf. Data were collected through web interviews from 1687 respondents,
with equal numbers of individuals who were (or believed they were) donor-conceived (n  562),
adopted (n  562), or raised by their biological parents (n  563). Id. at 119. The study has received
some criticism. See, e.g., Eric Blyth & Wendy Kramer, “My Daddy’s Name is Donor”: Read with
Caution! (July 9, 2010), http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_65970.asp; Julie Shapiro, Choosing Studies:
Eenie Meenie or Something More?, RELATED TOPICS (June 7, 2010), http://julieshapiro.wordpress.com/
2010/06/07/choosing-studies-eenie-meenie-or-something-more/. Indeed, two of the study’s authors stated
that their “findings suggest that openness alone does not resolve the complex risks to which children are
exposed when they are deliberately conceived not to know and be known by their biological fathers.”
Karen Clark & Elizabeth Marquardt, The Sperm-Donor Kids Are Not Really All Right, SLATE (June 14,
2010, 11:23 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2010/06/the_spermdonor_kids_
are_not_really_all_right.html. It should also be noted that one of the principal goals of the organization
that holds the copyright to the study is “[t]o increase the proportion of children growing up with their
two married parents.” Introduction, INST. FOR AM. VALUES, http://www.americanvalues.org/intro/ (last
visited May 31, 2011). Nonetheless, the study provides useful information.
82. MARQUARDT, GLENN & CLARK, supra note 81, at 88. Among respondents, thirty-three percent
“strongly” agreed, and thirty-seven percent “somewhat” agreed with the statement, “I find myself
wondering what my sperm donor’s family is like.” Id.
83. Id. at 90.
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their families.84 Nonetheless, most were positive about donor conception itself,
and much more likely than children raised in other types of families to consider
becoming donors themselves.85
The most common reported main reason for children’s searching for donor
siblings was curiosity about things like similarities in appearance and personal-
ity (ninety-four percent cited this as one of the reasons for searching, and
forty-four percent cited this as the main reason),86 followed by “[t]o know and
understand a ‘missing’ part of me” (sixteen percent cited this as their main
reason).87 Other popular reasons involved getting to know genetic and ancestral
history.88 Interestingly, there was a strong association between the family type
of the respondent and the explanation of “find[ing] a new family member” as a
reason for searching for donor siblings, with more children from single mother
families citing this as a main reason.89 These children are clearly looking for
family-type connections.
When offspring search, they are also curious about the characteristics of the
donor.90 Some oft-cited reasons included “[t]o have a better understanding of
my ancestral history and family background” (79%), “[t]o have a better under-
standing of my genetic make-up” (79%), and “[t]o have a better understanding
of why I am who I am” (75%).91
When it comes to relationships with biological half-siblings, the situation is,
again, quite complicated, involving the offspring as well as their parents. While
the offspring might choose contact, their parents may not.92 On the other hand,
most people feel “‘overwhelmingly positive’ after some ticklish starts.”93 Con-
tact might be occasional, at the level of sending holiday greetings, or much
84. Id. at 95, 104. Forty-three percent of the donors conceived either strongly or somewhat agreed
with the statement, “I feel confused about who is a member of my family and who is not,” compared to
fifteen percent of adoptees and six percent of the biological children. Id. at 95.
85. Id. at 97–99.
86. Vasanti Jadva, Tabitha Freeman, Wendy Kramer & Susan Golombok, Experiences of Offspring
Searching for and Contacting Their Donor Siblings and Donor, 20 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 523,
527–28 & tbl.4 (2010).
87. Id. at 528 & tbl.4.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 528–29.
91. Id. at 529 tbl.5. In terms of what triggered searching for donor siblings and/or donors, the most
popular reason selected by participants was a change in personal circumstances or a life event,
specifically, “becoming a teenager,” “becoming an adult,” “getting married or forming a long-term
relationship,” having a “personal crisis,” “an illness or other medical condition,” and “planning to have
children or having children.” Id. at 529.
92. See Q & A with Wendy Kramer, in BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: MOVING BEYOND SECRECY AND SHAME
25, 30–31 (Mikki Morrissette ed., 2006).
93. Carey Goldberg, The Search for DGM 2598, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 23, 2008, http://www.boston.com/
news/science/articles/2008/11/23/the_search_for_dgm_2598/ (quoting Wendy Kramer from the Donor
Sibling Registry). The situation is not necessarily easy to navigate; Wendy Kramer reports that, “Once
people connect, . . . it’s a delicate dance figuring out, ‘Who are we to each other?’” Id.; see also Jadva,
Freeman, Kramer & Golombok, supra note 86; Scheib & Ruby, supra note 75, at 35–36 (reporting that
“the most common theme was that the families ‘clicked’”).
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closer, with the children growing up together94 and the parents bonding. Indeed,
for many donor-conceived offspring and their parents, they want contact, rather
than simply written information, and these contacts to lead them to some kind
of “family feeling.”95 Many people who have connected feel as though they are
starting to create a family,96 albeit not necessarily a “close” relationship.97
Wendy Kramer has corresponded with many parents of donor-conceived chil-
dren who are seeking advice “on how to navigate their new relationships. Some
parents in the newly formed donor groups simply want to trade basic informa-
tion, while others want to form groups that spend holidays together, forming
familial-type relationships.”98
These are all “new relationships,” and they are developing outside of how the
law has traditionally defined family—as including married biological parents
with children—while using genetic connection, a well-recognized basis for
creating family, as the starting point for the relationship.
II. THE LAWS OF THE DONOR WORLD
Gamete donation remains a largely private transaction that is handled through
contract and intention with virtually no substantive regulation. The federal
government has undertaken some limited regulation of donor-gamete safety as
well as marketing practices.99 A minority of states currently addresses some
aspects of the gamete-provision process, typically requiring additional screening
for donors or record keeping by clinics, and fourteen states require insurance
coverage for some aspects of infertility treatment and diagnosis.100 The rules
that do exist in this field focus on the medical and consumer protection aspects
94. As one eight-year-old said of his donor-conceived half-sibling, “I call him brother . . . . We kind
of got along right away.” Rick Montgomery, Donor-Conceived Siblings Connect: Online Registry
Matches Relatives, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 19, 2009, at 9D.
95. Pim M.W. Janssens, Commentary, Colouring the Different Phases in Gamete and Embryo
Donation, 24 HUM. REPROD. 502, 502 (2009); see also All Things Considered: Donor-Conceived Kids
Connect with Half Siblings (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 26, 2009) (“It’s a new form of family. It’s not,
perhaps, what people traditionally understand by families, sort of mum, dad, child. And yes, they do
describe each other as brothers and sisters.” (voice of sociologist Tabitha Freeman)).
96. See, e.g., CHERYL SHULER, SPERM DONOR  DAD: A SINGLE WOMAN’S STORY OF CREATING A FAMILY
WITH AN UNKNOWN DONOR 81 (2010) (describing the time when “we truly started to become a family,”
and “[t]he kids acted like siblings”).
97. See, e.g., Hertz & Mattes, supra note 76, at 21.
98. Telephone Interview with Wendy Kramer, Dir., Donor Sibling Registry (Sept. 15, 2011).
99. See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 23; Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1195.
100. State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/InsuranceCoverageforInfertilityLaws/tabid/
14391/Default.aspx (last updated Apr. 2011); see also I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen, Trading-Off
Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and Should It
Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485, 537–40 (2010) (identifying the different existing mandates based on
how generous they are, and whether they require full coverage); Yaniv Heled, The Regulation of
Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive Tissue—The Need for Federal Regulation, 11 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 243, 255–58 (2010) (discussing the paucity of state regulation).
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of donor-conceived families.101
The donor world has become medicalized, which is the process that occurs
when a human condition or a human problem is transformed into a medical
issue.102 Even efforts to arrange for the transfer of parental rights from the
donor to the recipients have historically required a physician’s involvement,
with minimal attention to the potential relationships or offspring that result from
gamete provision.103 While the parentage laws are moving away from this
medical model, there remains no recognition of the interests of offspring or the
familial entity.104 This Part explores the laws that frame the donor world,
addressing those applicable to parentage in donor families, the differing types of
secrecy, and the enforcement of agreements relating to donation.
A. THE REAL PARENTS
As for legalization of the resulting relationships, states have adopted varying
approaches that generally attempt to facilitate transactions in gametes and
embryos by allocating parental rights to the intending parents, not the gamete
providers. Nonetheless, and perhaps surprisingly, there is no universal answer to
the question of the legal relationship between donor and offspring. In some
states, the designation of parenthood turns on whether a doctor was involved in
the insemination process, and the absence of physician involvement may con-
vert a donor into a father.105 In other states, the law is clear that a donor has no
101. See, e.g., Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 6, at 511 (arguing that “ethical understandings in the
fertility context, to the extent they can be successfully forged at all, must occur within the interstices of
market mechanisms”).
102. PETER CONRAD, THE MEDICALIZATION OF SOCIETY: ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN CONDITIONS
INTO TREATABLE DISORDERS 4 (2007); see also Peter Conrad, Medicalization and Social Control, 18 ANN.
REV. SOC. 209, 223–24 (1992) (noting that a downside of medicalization is “the sociological concern
with how the medical model decontextualizes social problems, and collaterally, puts them under
medical control”). Although insemination by donor could be deemed to have been “demedicalized,”
see, e.g., Daniel Wikler & Norma J. Wikler, Turkey-Baster Babies: The Demedicalization of Artificial
Insemination, 69 MILBANK Q. 5 (1991), and indeed, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
does not define it as part of “assisted reproductive technology,” see supra note 4, it still occurs within
the larger context of medicalization.
103. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-702 (LexisNexis 2009); Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d
482, 487 (Cal Ct. App. 2005) (holding that physician involvement deprives donor of parental rights);
see also J.F. v. W.M. (In re Paternity of M.F. and C.F.), 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
(Crone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that donor agreements, to be enforceable,
must require that sperm be provided to a licensed physician).
104. But, as discussed infra notes 249–50 and accompanying text, the State of Washington in 2011
enacted the first law in the United States recognizing that donor-conceived people have rights to access
medical and, under some circumstances, identifying information.
105. See, e.g., Steven S., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 487 (holding that physician involvement deprives donor
of parental rights); In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1042 (Kan. 2007) (same); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821,
821–22, 824 (N.J. Cumberland Cnty. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977) (awarding rights to known donor
when no doctor was involved); C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc. 2d 9, 11–13 (Ohio Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct.
Com. Pl. 1994) (faulting failure to comply with physician involvement requirement and denying
defendant’s attempt to invoke protection of artificial insemination law); Polikoff, supra note 10, at
241–46 (discussing state laws).
Primarily, it is known donors—those with whom the mother has some kind of prior relationship, such
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parental rights, regardless of physician involvement.106 Gaps in existing state
regulations are vast; although virtually all states have laws on some aspects of
sperm donation, not all states address circumstances involving unmarried par-
ents.107 States are increasingly likely to address donor eggs, although only about
sixteen states address embryos.108
No uniformity exists among states concerning the legal relationships estab-
lished through collaborative reproduction,109 although the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has twice attempted to
develop model parenthood legislation: the 1973 and the 2002 Uniform Parent-
age Acts (UPAs).110 States have taken three general approaches to parenting
issues when donor gametes are involved. Approximately twenty states have
laws modeled on either the 1973 or 2002 version of the UPA, while the
remaining states either have no statute or have statutes diverging significantly
from both UPAs.111
The 1973 UPA owes much of its approach to an April 1966 article by
as a relative, close friend, or boyfriend—who may be labeled as “father.” In this context, it is important
to distinguish the following: (a) the assumptions of the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973, discussed infra
notes 110–23 and accompanying text, which assumes a heterosexual infertile couple model, with
“donors” contributing without intercourse; (b) practical differences between known and unknown
donors, such as the likelihood that a known donor may want some involvement, even if not a father
role; and (c) incentives to use anonymous donors because of the lack of legal certainty about donor
status.
106. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 2010) (donor relinquishes all parental rights).
107. See Ami S. Jaeger, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, Collaborative Reproduction, and
Adoption, in 2 ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE §§ 14.05, 14.20 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2010).
108. See Embryo and Gamete Disposition Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/health/embryodisposition.htm (last updated July 2007) (listing state laws and legislation
regarding the use and storage of frozen embryos).
109. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J.
LEGAL MED. 35, 49 (2000); Joslin, supra note 1, at 1184–88; Kira Horstmeyer, Note, Putting Your Eggs
in Someone Else’s Basket: Inserting Uniformity into the Uniform Parentage Act’s Treatment of Assisted
Reproduction, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 671, 684–90 (2007).
110. See John J. Sampson, Uniform Parentage Act (2000), with Prefatory Note and Comments (and
with Unofficial Annotations), 35 FAM. L.Q. 83 (2001); John J. Sampson, Amendments to the Uniform
Parentage Act as Last Amended in 2002 with Prefatory Note and Comments, 37 FAM. L.Q. 5 (2003).
The Commissioners (now the Uniform Law Commission) also promulgated the Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception and the Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Acts in 1988 for more
limited circumstances. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (2000) (amended 2002).
111. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-101 to 26-17-905 (LexisNexis 2009); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600–
7730 (Deering 2006 & Supp. 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-4-101 to -130 (West 2005 & Supp.
2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-101 to -904 (2009 & Supp. 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 584-1 to
-26 (LexisNexis 2010); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1 to /3, 45/1 to /28 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1110 to -1138 (2000 & Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51–.74 (West 2007
& Supp. 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.817–.852 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to -123,
40-6-131 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 126.011–.371 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-38 to -59 (West 2002
& Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11A-101 to -903 (2006 & Supp. 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 14-20-01 to -66 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.01–.97 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, §§ 7700-101 to -902 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-8-1 to -28 (2003 & Supp. 2010); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.701–.763 (West 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-101 to -902 (LexisNexis
2008); 2011 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 283 (West); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-901 to -907 (2011).
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Professor Harry D. Krause published in the Texas Law Review, titled Bringing
the Bastard into the Great Society—A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy.112
Although his primary concern was children born outside of marriage, Krause
included provisions in his Proposed Uniform Act concerning the status of a
child born through artificial insemination.113 Indeed, like Krause’s 1966 article,
the Uniform Parentage Act addressed issues involving artificial insemination.114
It applied only to married couples, providing that if (1) the husband’s consent
was given in writing, and (2) the insemination was done under the supervision
of a licensed physician, then the husband would be the legal father.115 The UPA
did not address nonmarital children conceived through artificial insemination,
and it left the parental status of the sperm provider unclear not only when the
woman was not married but also, even if she were married, when a physician
was not involved in the insemination process.116
In an effort to respond to the enormous changes in the reproductive technol-
ogy field, in government regulation, and in the construction of families, NCCUSL
112. Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society—A Proposed Uniform Act on
Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829 (1966). His approach was written against a background legal context in
which some states had held that a married woman who had used artificial insemination, even with the
consent of her husband, had committed adultery. Indeed, cases involving artificial insemination had
reached conflicting conclusions on whether a child born to a married woman, who had been insemi-
nated with a third party’s sperm, albeit with the husband’s consent, was legitimate, or whether the wife
had committed adultery and thus made the child illegitimate because the marital presumption did not
apply. For example, in the 1963 case involving Stanley and Annette Gursky, a New York judge held that
even if Stanley had consented, artificial insemination by a donor was indeed “adultery” and any
resulting child “illegitimate.” Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). While the
court acknowledged that the New York Sanitary Code regulated the practice of donor insemination, it
held that this law was entirely separate from any parentage determination “and can in no wise be
deemed to sanction the practice of artificial insemination or to render legitimate any issue thereof.” Id.
at 410–11 (“[T]he child in the instant case, which was indisputably the offspring of artificial insemina-
tion by a third-party donor with the consent of the mother’s husband, is not the legitimate issue of the
husband.”).
Gursky echoed an earlier Canadian case, in which the court held that donor insemination of the wife
without the consent of her husband is adultery, regardless of the fact that no act of sexual intercourse
had occurred. Orford v. Orford (1921), 58 D.L.R. 251, 258 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.). Nonetheless, not all
courts that considered this issue reached the same result. By contrast, in a 1945 Chicago case, the judge
held that adultery did not include artificial insemination by donor. See Alfred Koerner, Medicolegal
Considerations in Artificial Insemination, 8 LA. L. REV. 484, 494 (1948). See generally Gaia Bernstein,
The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L.
REV. 1035, 1060–71 (2002) (describing the slow legal acceptance of the use of donor sperm).
113. He proposed that, if a husband had consented to artificial insemination of his wife, then the
resulting child would conclusively be deemed legitimate, with the right to share the same name as the
father. Krause, supra note 112, at 833. Krause ultimately served as the official reporter for the 1973
UPA. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (1973).
114. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973).
115. Id. § 5(a). The records could be opened “only upon an order of the court for good cause
shown.” Id.
116. See, e.g., Polikoff, supra note 10, at 234–35. Even today, only four states and the District of
Columbia explicitly address children born to nonmarital couples. Joslin, supra note 1, at 1186.
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proposed a replacement Uniform Parentage Act in 2000.117 The new Act, which
was amended in 2002, addressed a variety of legal problems that might result
from egg or sperm donation as well as from the freezing of prezygotes.118
According to the final Act, an egg or sperm donor is not a parent when a child is
conceived through “assisted reproduction,” meaning reproduction not involving
sexual intercourse.119 Indeed, the 2002 UPA comments clarify that “[i]n sum,
donors are eliminated from the parental equation.”120
The drafters of the Act candidly admit, however, that the UPA does not deal
with many of the other contentious issues involved in regulating the new
reproductive technologies, including the status of embryos or oversight of
fertility clinics.121 Moreover, it has not yet resulted in uniformity. While a
number of states have statutes somewhat similar to the 2002 UPA,122 some of
them have adopted significant modifications or limitations to the model lan-
guage.123
The “laboratory of states” allows for a multiplicity of approaches124 to
parenthood, but the resulting patchwork results in uncertainty for parents,
children, and donors, and fosters an incoherent approach to fundamental issues
of intimacy and identity. Many states have not addressed the complex issues of
parenthood involving nonmarital reproduction, egg donation, lack of physician
117. Parentage Act Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM., http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?
titleParentage%20Act (last visited Oct. 20, 2011); see also Victoria Degtyareva, Note, Defining
Family in Immigration Law: Accounting for Nontraditional Families in Citizenship by Descent, 120
YALE L.J. 862, 886–89 (2011) (discussing state adoptions of the differing uniform acts).
118. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note to art. 7 (2000) (amended 2002).
119. Id. §§ 102(4), 702.
120. Id. § 702 cmt.
121. Id. The new UPA also incorporated the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act,
a 1988 proposal that had been enacted by only two states, North Dakota and Virginia. Id. at art. 8 cmt.
122. There are nine states that have officially adopted the UPA: Alabama, Delaware, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Legislative Fact Sheet—Parentage
Act, UNIF. LAW COMM., http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?titleParentage%20Act (last
visited Oct. 10, 2011).
123. While, for example, Alabama is listed as a 2000 UPA state by the Uniform Law Commission,
see id., it is actually a hybrid, with some statutory language similar to the 1973 UPA. For example,
Alabama limits parental rights in artificial insemination to “married women.” See ALA. CODE § 26-17-
702 (LexisNexis 2009) (“A donor who donates to a licensed physician for use by a married woman is
not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”). Moreover, Alabama requires the
use of a “licensed physician,” like the 1973 UPA. Id. Nonetheless, Alabama’s code defines “donor” and
“assisted reproduction” in accordance with the 2002 UPA and effectively bestows the same rights to
recipients, so long as they are married. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 102(4), (8) (2000) (amended
2002), with ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-102(4), (8) (LexisNexis 2009).
For general commentary on the existence of state laws with respect to parentage and donor gametes,
see SUSAN L. CROCKIN & HOWARD W. JONES, JR., LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: THE EVOLVING LAW AND POLICY OF
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 134, 194 (2010). The authors note that, “[i]n contrast to very
common sperm donation statutes, only a handful of states (eight at last count) have enacted statutes that
explicitly define parentage of children born through egg donation.” Id. at 193–94.
124. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998); see also
Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 21–23 (2010)
(arguing for expanded visions of federalism including other decision-making entities beyond the states).
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involvement, or known donors who do, or do not, seek rights.
The parentage statutes that are on the books generally attempt to erase donors
by identifying the legal parents.125 Donors are similarly absent in other areas of
the law. Apart from what is required for safety regulation, there are few state
laws that require any records from donors, that require clinics or banks to
maintain records, or that establish any legal terms regarding confidentiality and
disclosure.126 Donors generally do not even know whether their gametes have
become children. While the law is silent on contacts between donor-conceived
families, law and practice are diverging substantially here, with donor-
conceived family members trying to find both other biologically related people
as well as donors.
B. PRACTICES OF SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE
There are multiple levels of secrecy and disclosure in the donor world. First,
many donor-conceived offspring simply do not know that they are donor-
conceived. A second level concerns the layers of secrecy between offspring,
donors, and parents who have used donor gametes. The secrecy that pervades
this world is the product of cultural norms and contracts, not constitutional
principles or legislative decision making. While donors and parents may have
signed agreements pertaining to anonymity, very few court opinions have
interpreted the validity, and applicability, of these documents.
Infertility has traditionally been subject to stigma.127 This stigma has helped
keep the use of other-provided gametes an often furtive secret between an
individual and a physician. Notwithstanding the increasing public attention to
the potential use of donor gametes, most people do not reveal whether they have
used their own eggs or sperm to create a baby.128 When it was disclosed that
Michael Jackson might be genetically unrelated to his children, this was major
celebrity gossip; the question of donor eggs is unanswered about such well-
known stars as Holly Hunter, who gave birth to twins at the age of 47, or Geena
Davis, who also gave birth to twins at the age of 48.129
Historically, donor-conceived offspring were unlikely to find out their origins
125. Of course, some states do allow the donor and intending parent to enter into enforceable
agreements. See Polikoff, supra note 10, at 242.
126. This contrasts with the situation in other countries. See, e.g., Heled, supra note 100, at 282–87
(discussing regulations in Europe).
127. See, e.g., CHARIS THOMPSON, MAKING PARENTS: THE ONTOLOGICAL CHOREOGRAPHY OF REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES 128–29 (2005); Lucy Frith, Gamete Donation and Anonymity: The Ethical and
Legal Debate, 16 HUM. REPROD. 818, 822 (2001).
128. See, e.g., Suter, supra note 30, at 261 (“[T]he market favors anonymity. From the inception of
artificial insemination, anonymity and secrecy have been the norm.”).
129. Elizabeth Cohen, Pregnant at 47: Can I Do That?, CNN (May 27, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/
2010-05-27/health/late.pregnancy.risks_1_donor-eggs-reproductive-biology-associates-age-limit?_
sPM:HEALTH; Mia Freedman, Another Day, Another 47 Year Old Celebrity Pregnant with Twins,
MAMAMIA (May 31, 2007, 12:29 PM), http://www.mamamia.com.au/entertainment/another-day-another-
47-year-old-celebrity-pregnant-with-twins/. When heterosexual friends learn that I am writing about
donor-conceived families, they may surreptitiously whisper to me that they are very interested for
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until one of their parents died, or until they went for genetic testing. As recently
as a decade ago, most parents simply did not tell their children.130 People who
had used donor sperm during that time period were counseled that they should
not think of the donor as a person, rather as a sperm provider, and their talk
about donors reflects this erasure of the donor as they create their own fami-
lies.131 Until the 1960s, an additional pressure for married women to preserve
the secrecy of donor sperm was fear of legal charges of adultery.132
While those in the adoption community typically tell children that they are
adopted,133 and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine recommends
disclosing to children their donor-conceived status,134 many parents still do not
tell their children that they are donor-conceived. Researchers have found that
heterosexual families are least likely to disclose.135
C. CHANGING AGREEMENTS
As discussed earlier, the secrecy is dissolving, and gamete recipients and
their children are starting to search for people who share the same biological
heritage—and for the donors themselves. Nonetheless, most donors are prom-
ised secrecy.136 No governmental (state or federal) registries exist where people
can go for information (other than in Washington State);137 by contrast, in
adoption, there are state registries, and an increasing movement to allow for
disclosure of identities of biological parents.138 Indeed, the United States does
personal reasons, but that no one else knows about their use of donor gametes. Gay and lesbian friends,
by contrast, are much more open.
130. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Quandary on Donor Eggs: What to Tell the Children, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/18/us/quandary-on-donor-eggs-what-to-tell-the-children.html; see
Victoria M. Grace, Ken R. Daniels & Wayne Gillett, The Donor, the Father, and the Imaginary
Constitution of the Family: Parents’ Constructions in the Case of Donor Insemination, 66 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 301, 311 (2008); see also ADAM PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION: HOW THE ADOPTION REVOLUTION IS
TRANSFORMING OUR FAMILIES—AND AMERICA 186–96 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing how parents of adopted
children handle their children’s questions).
131. Grace, Daniels & Gillett, supra note 130, at 301–02.
132. See supra note 112 (discussing adultery cases).
133. See, e.g., PERTMAN, supra note 130, at 188–89.
134. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Informing Offspring of Their Conception by
Gamete Donation, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 527, 530 (2004).
135. E.g., Beeson, Jennings & Kramer, supra note 80, at 2416; Freeman, Jadva, Kramer &
Golombok, supra note 77; Ruth Landau & Ruth Weissenberg, Disclosure of Donor Conception in
Single-Mother Families: Views and Concerns, 25 HUM. REPROD. 942, 943 (2010).
136. Sperm banks and egg donors are increasingly offering identity-release programs through which
donors agree to allow their identities to be disclosed once their offspring reach the age of eighteen.
MUNDY, supra note 38, at 113–14; SPAR, supra note 14, at 38–39; Joanna E. Scheib & Rachel A.
Cushing, Open-Identity Donor Insemination in the United States: Is It on the Rise?, 88 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 231, 231–32 (2007).
137. See 2011 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 283, § 53 (West) (adding new section to WASH. REV. CODE ch.
26.26).
138. NAOMI CAHN, EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., OLD LESSONS FOR A NEW WORLD: APPLYING
ADOPTION RESEARCH AND EXPERIENCE TO ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 11 (2009), http://
www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications/2009_02_OldLessons.pdf.
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not even regulate how many times an individual donor can contribute, thereby
leading to the possibility of dozens, if not hundreds, of offspring from the same
donor.139 Donors are given numbers, and recipients know their donors by
number.140
Agreements in the donor world are tricky. Consider a few examples. K.M.
was an egg donor who signed a four-page form in which she explicitly agreed to
waive all rights towards any resulting child, and agreed “not to attempt to
discover the identity of the recipient thereof.”141 The fertilized eggs were
transferred to E.G., who gave birth to twins. K.M. and E.G. raised the twins
together. When the two women dissolved their relationship, K.M. sued. The
California Supreme Court held that the written waiver form was ineffective and
found K.M. to be a second parent of the twins.142 The case is a landmark in the
field of same-sex parental rights, and scholarly commentary has focused on its
finding of two mothers143—not on the anonymity and disclosure issues. Yet the
case is also a landmark for making clear that a child’s interests may trump an
agreement between a donor and a clinic.144 Indeed, while there is longstanding
doctrine that contracts will not be enforced if they violate public policy,145 the
California court did not even refer to this principle.
Or consider the rare cases in which a parent has sought the identity of a
sperm donor.146 Although few U.S. courts have ever had to consider the validity
139. See Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line—or the Curtain?—for Reproductive
Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59, 82–83 (2009).
140. SHULER, supra note 96, at 18. The difficulties of collecting information about donor-conceived
offspring begin with the fact that there is not even an official record of how many children are born
each year as a result of donor sperm. See CAHN, supra note 23. Studies of the donor-conceived world
can only draw on subjects who know they are donor-conceived as well as donors and gamete recipients
who are willing to discuss their experiences, so there are certainly legitimate limitations on the data.
141. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 676 (Cal. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. Id. at 682.
143. E.g., Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1277 n.133 (2008); Melissa
Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94
VA. L. REV. 385, 442 n.204 (2008); Victoria Steely, . . . But a Child Can Have Two Mothers, 16 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 35, 38–42 (2007).
144. In the very different context of men who claim “tricked fatherhood,” or reliance on a woman’s
claim of birth control, or even when there has been statutory rape of an adolescent male, children’s
interests have trumped biological fathers’ lack of consent to procreative sex. See, e.g., Hermesmann v.
Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1274, 1279–80 (Kan. 1993); Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 682–86 (N.M. Ct. App.
2001); Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649,
664–66 (2008); I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115,
1128–29 (2008). Interestingly, for husbands who learn, upon divorce, that they are not the biological
fathers of children born into the marriage, courts may not always examine the children’s best interests.
See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.Q. 219, 224
(2011).
145. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988) (refusing to enforce surrogacy contract that
“conflict[ed] with . . . public policies”). See generally U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003) (unconscionability
provision for contracts for the sale of goods); id. § 2A-108 (unconscionability provision for lease
contracts).
146. For further discussion of other cases, see Naomi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need for a
Mandatory Donor Gamete Databank, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 203, 211–12 (2009).
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of agreements regarding confidentiality, they have articulated potential excep-
tions. In one of the only such cases, a Massachusetts court suggested that a
written contract guaranteeing confidentiality might be modified subsequently by
an oral representation that the donor was willing to have his identity dis-
closed.147 Moreover, known donors may seek to assume responsibility, even
against the preferences of the parents.148
While the law appropriately values the certainty and validity of contracts,
including those involving gamete donation, contract enforceability remains
subject to potentially changing laws. Certainly, if offspring are granted rights in
the future, then agreements to the contrary would be void; even retroactivity,
however, might not be a problem given the strength of the interests involved
and precedent. Allowing donor-conceived offspring access to information about
genetic half-siblings or the donor, notwithstanding any agreements between the
donor and the gamete bank, or understandings between the parents and the
bank, raises similar issues about the priority of other interests (whether they are
defined as the best interest of the child, the formation of alternative family
forms, etc.) when it comes to contract enforcement.
III. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF DONOR FAMILIES
As we think about donor-conceived families and their communities, there is a
profound irony that must be acknowledged. Family law is moving towards a
more expansive view of how families are formed, moving away from biology
and marriage as constitutive of family and instead becoming more accepting of
relationships based on function, affection, and contract.149 At the same time, it
is biology, and biology alone, that provides the basis for a connection between
donor-conceived family communities: their only link is an unknown donor’s
gametes.150
Donor-conceived families and their networks confound the legal issues, even
as these families construct emotional ties. They are the sites for several intersect-
ing legal paradigms showing the possibilities for grounding the appropriate
approach within existing law, and then adapting (perhaps even transcending)
these paradigms.
147. Doe v. XYZ Co., 914 N.E.2d 117, 122 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009).
148. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 1, at 1200; Nancy D. Polikoff, Breaking the Link Between Biology
and Parental Rights in Planned Lesbian Families: When Semen Donors Are Not Fathers, 2 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 57, 87–88 (2000) [hereinafter Polikoff, Breaking the Link]; Polikoff, supra note 10;
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To Meet the Needs of
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 468 & n.30 (1990)
[hereinafter Polikoff, Redefining Parenthood].
149. See Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 73 (2007)
(discussing function and affection); Polikoff, supra note 10, at 216 (same); Rosenbury, supra note 1, at
193–95 (same); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1461
(discussing private agreements).
150. See Dolgin, supra note 67, at 349 (analyzing “the shifting uses of biology in the social
construction of family”).
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As discussed in this Part, three distinct strands of jurisprudence intersect here,
providing space in which to adapt family law principles. First, and foundational,
is Supreme Court jurisprudence on the recognition of familial relationships. The
Court has analyzed horizontal relationships between adults and vertical ones
between parents and children. Throughout, there is a tension in family law
between recognition of the rights of individuals who choose to form families as
opposed to the rights that flow from family status. The second jurisprudential
strand focuses on horizontal relationships, challenging the identification of the
family with domesticity.151 This critique underlies the “friends entitled to
benefits” literature, and it has, until now, primarily focused on adult nonfamilial
friendships. Finally, the “multiple parenthood” literature has primarily focused
on the relationship of parents and children who have shared dependency,
caretaking, and home.
A. STRAND 1: CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE ON THE FAMILY AS ENTITY OR
SEPARATE PARTS
The challenges of donor-conceived families and their communities also take
their place within one of the fundamental tensions in family law, a tension made
explicit in Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird: the family as an
entity versus the family as composed of individuals.152 Constitutional protection
for the family began as a relational and status-based concept applicable between
parent and child and between wife and husband, recognizing a parent’s right to
direct her child’s upbringing in Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, and the privacy of the marital relationship in Griswold and Loving v.
Virginia.153 The Court used equal protection (not substantive due process and
concepts of “liberty” or autonomy) in Eisenstadt, holding that whatever rights
attached to the marital couple encompassed “the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion” in intimate
life.154 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justice
O’Connor’s opinion recognized a wife’s right to terminate a pregnancy in
opposition to her husband’s wishes.155 Lawrence v. Texas takes its place in this
canon, recognizing the right of “two adults” to “engage[] in sexual practices
151. For a discussion of domesticity, see infra section III.B.
152. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–86
(1965).
153. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (holding that Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute
violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (protecting use of contraceptives
by married couples); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (protecting, in dicta, parents’
rights to educate their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 403 (1923) (reversing
conviction of teacher who had instructed child in foreign language in violation of Nebraska statute
because Fourteenth Amendment protects teacher’s liberty to provide such instruction); see also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972) (allowing Amish parents to withdraw children from
school after eighth grade).
154. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
155. 505 U.S. 833, 893–95 (1992).
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common to a homosexual lifestyle” and to be accorded “respect for their private
lives,”156 affirming the emotional intimacy of a couple.157 Gonzales v. Carhart,
which dealt explicitly with an abortion procedure, broadened the parameters in
which the state could act to limit procreative freedom and interfere in the
family.158
Children’s rights, within this canon, differ from those of adults. The Court
has largely reinforced the notion that the traditional family unit provides
adequate constitutional protection for children. Particularly in the substantive
due process context, the Court has tended to equate children’s interests with
those of their parents and to protect children derivatively, through such doc-
trines as parental autonomy and familial privacy.159 Parents are entitled, based
on several Supreme Court decisions, to substantial deference on their choice of
how to raise their children.160 Even when it comes to children’s rights to receive
adequate services to prevent abuse and neglect by family members, the Court
has generally reinforced the state’s decision-making process rather than chil-
dren’s rights.161 The failure to recognize sibling associational rights provides
yet another example of the paucity of children’s rights.162
Finally, the Supreme Court’s inconsistent jurisprudence on the rights created
156. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
157. See Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construc-
tion of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1298 (2009) (“In Eisenstadt, the Court appear[ed] to be
floating the possibility of organizing intimate life in a more continuous way than previously seen. . . . [And
in Lawrence,] the continuum towards which Eisenstadt gestures becomes more fully elaborated.”);
Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 60, at 810.
158. 550 U.S. 124, 163–64 (2007); see also Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will
Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 843, 848–49 (2007) (noting that, in Gonzales, “[t]he Court
emphasized the state’s legitimate interest in the fetus’s potential life”).
159. See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 862–63
(2007). In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court refused to decide whether a child had “a liberty interest,
symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship.” 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989)
(plurality opinion). It has never recognized such an interest.
160. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66, 75 (2000); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402–03
(1923); see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
161. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 360 (1992); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–97 (1989) (holding that social workers had no obligation to prevent
child abuse by removing child from father’s custody, despite receiving several complaints).
162. The Supreme Court has never directly decided whether siblings enjoy constitutionally protected
associational rights under the First or Fourteenth Amendments, even though the Court has recognized
that the Bill of Rights “must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal
relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State.” Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (citations omitted).
The circuits are not uniform when it comes to recognizing the constitutional rights of siblings.
Compare Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 932, 944 n.18 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[The petitioner] points to no
authority supporting the proposition that there is a fundamental liberty interest for adults to remain in
the United States because their parents and siblings are here.”), with Trujillo v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,
768 F.2d 1186, 1188–89 (10th Cir. 1985) (recognizing the possibility of granting traditionally filial
rights to siblings); see also Mandelbaum, supra note 3, at 29–30 (“The United States Supreme Court
has never specifically addressed the issue of the constitutional rights of siblings to the preservation of
their relationship through contact, and most lower federal and state courts also have been reluctant to
find a constitutional basis for the maintenance of these relationships.” (footnote omitted)).
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by biological relationships provides one more context to evaluate donor-created
families. In Michael H., the most controversial aspect of the decision was the
plurality’s effort to define the liberty interest at stake in terms of those rights
(whether of the parent or the child) that had historically received constitutional
protection.163 The plurality rejected the dissent’s interpretation of the Stanley
line of cases as staking recognition of a liberty interest to “biological fatherhood
plus an established parental relationship,” factors which Scalia conceded existed
in Michael H. as well.164 Insisting that such an interpretation distorted the
rationale of those cases, he explained that they rested “upon the historic
respect—indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term—traditionally ac-
corded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family.”165 It is the
unitary, traditional, marital family relationship, not the biological connection,
which Scalia sees as entitled to constitutional protection.166
The Supreme Court’s privacy and family cases suggest different, and possibly
conflicting, ways of analyzing donor family connections. We might think of
each member of the donor triad as holding separate, potentially competing
rights: offspring versus donor versus parents.167 When they are young, an
offspring’s rights will have less strength than those of the donor or parents.
Even when offspring are adults, however, framed in terms of privacy interests,
the donor and the parents may have rights that could trump the interest of the
offspring.168 If we make children’s best interests169 central, then perhaps their
163. 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
164. Id. at 123. In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court first accorded procedural due process protections to a
nonmarital father. 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983)
(holding that an unwed father acquires due process protection only when the father is committed and
responsible to the child); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (invalidating statute that
distinguished between unwed fathers and unwed mothers); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255–56
(1978) (holding that equal protection does not require unwed father to be treated identically with
married father who separates or divorces).
165. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123.
166. Scalia insisted that:
The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society, which we have referred to as the
“unitary family,” is typified, of course, by the marital family, but also includes the household
of unmarried parents and their children. Perhaps the concept can be expanded even beyond
this, but it will bear no resemblance to traditionally respected relationships—and will thus
cease to have any constitutional significance—if it is stretched so far as to include the
relationship established between a married woman, her lover, and their child, during a
3-month sojourn in St. Thomas, or during a subsequent 8-month period when, if he happened
to be in Los Angeles, he stayed with her and the child.
Id. at 123 n.3.
167. The notion of a donor “triad” is based on the related concept of an adoption triad. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Siberry Chestney, Note, The Right To Know One’s Genetic Origin: Can, Should, or Must a
State that Extends this Right to Adoptees Extend an Analogous Right to Children Conceived with Donor
Gametes?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 365, 367 n.17 (2001). For donor families, a three-dimensional figure (a
pyramid, for example) might be more appropriate as a means of recognizing the central genetic role of
the donor to a series of offspring and their families.
168. For one articulation of these potential conflicts, see Julie L. Sauer, Comment, Competing
Interests and Gamete Donation: The Case for Anonymity, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 919, 939–47 (2009).
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rights—however defined—might trump those of adults. On the other hand, this
entire framework is predicated on potential conflicts among the different individu-
als involved,170 and may itself threaten the connections that characterize these
relationships. And it assumes that interests are unitary and unchanging, contrary
to the reality of donor families. Parents often want contact with other donor-
related families; donors often want contact with the families they have cre-
ated.171 Assuming common interests, and facilitating contact, then, might be a
more appropriate presumption than presuming potential conflict.
B. STRAND 2: THE CRITIQUE OF THE FAMILY AS ENSHRINED DOMESTICITY
A second jurisprudential strand in theorizing about the family is grounded in
what I call the “critique of the family as enshrined domesticity.” This critique
begins with the observation that families are typically viewed in law and in
society as “domesticated,” that is, as establishing and maintaining interdependen-
cies between adult partners and/or their children, living together. Under the
conventional view, partners who do not live together are viewed as unconven-
tional172 and present difficulties for legal doctrines of intimacy that presume
cohabitation.173 Yet the domesticated family, according to this critique, consti-
tutes a narrow misdescription of actual familial relationships, and this image is
problematic for several different reasons. As Laura Rosenbury notes, “few
[legal] scholars have considered whether family law should recognize care
provided outside of the home, and no scholar has considered whether family
169. The concept of the “child’s best interest” is central to family law, although, of course, multiple
definitions of children’s best interests exist in this context. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 6, at 892–95.
The complexity here results from acknowledging that “offspring” or “donor-conceived people” can be
either children or adults and, accordingly, their interests may vary depending on their age.
170. There may be no actual conflict; offspring may have no desire for any information about
donors, or donors, offspring, and parents may all prefer contact. Nonetheless, the process of evaluating
and providing a specific accounting of each individual’s rights might create a conflict where none
exists.
Of course, this particular framework is no more predicated upon potential conflict among different
individuals than is any other situation that ends up in court. The presumption of conflict does not,
however, emanate solely from the adversarial nature of the American legal system generally. We could
instead imagine a framework that presupposes harmony among the interests of all involved, see, e.g.,
Huntington, supra note 143, at 1287–1302 (advocating a de-emphasis on adversarial decision making
in family law in favor of a model that recognizes connections between parties), or that does not
privilege the interests of parents to make choices that will bind their children in perpetuity.
171. For example, Wendy Kramer supported her son’s efforts to find his donor-conceived family
community. And donors may actually think of themselves as parents. In her study, Rene Almeling found
that “most” of the men thought of themselves as fathers to their donor-conceived offspring, while
“most” of the women did not consider themselves to be mothers. ALMELING, supra note 15, at 145, 149.
172. See SASHA ROSENEIL, SOCIABILITY, SEXUALITY, SELF: RELATIONALITY AND INDIVIDUALIZATION (2010);
Sasha Roseneil, On Not Living with a Partner: Unpicking Coupledom and Cohabitation, 11 SOC. RES.
ONLINE (Sept. 30, 2006), http://www.socresonline.org.uk/11/3/roseneil.html.
173. See, e.g., Devaney v. L’Esperance, 949 A.2d 743, 744 (N.J. 2008) (holding that cohabitation is
not a necessary element of a claim for palimony, though a “marital-type” relationship is still required).
In its insistence that a nonmarital relationship resemble a marital relationship before the imposition of
financial obligations, however, the court did not challenge the dominance of marriage as model.
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law should recognize the care provided and received by friends.”174 Families
are rarely autonomous groupings, and require support not just from the state but
also from their communities and friends.175
Outside of the law, some of these relationships, which may involve intimacy
or child rearing, are beginning to be identified and studied. Sociologists have
labeled relationships involving intimate adult partners who do not live in the
same household but who think of themselves as a couple as “living apart
together relationships” (or LATs).176 LATs may be more descriptive of status for
approximately one-third of people identified as “single” in various demographic
surveys.177 In one of the few in-depth studies, the researchers found similarities
and differences between LATs and other intimate partnerships. For example,
although everyone could rely on their partners for support, “the predicted
probability of [heterosexuals’] being able to rely on a partner ‘a lot’ for help
with a serious problem is .87 for a married person, .82 for a cohabiter, and .59
for someone in a LAT union.”178 This does not necessarily mean that LAT
relationships should be excluded from the application of traditional family law,
but it might suggest somewhat different presumptions on issues like property
division or maintenance upon dissolution.
A second challenge to the family as domesticity is based on an analysis of
relationships that exist on a continuum between family and friendship. They do
not involve sexual intimacy nor are they based on shared genetics, but they do
involve emotional intimacy. People may, on the one hand, clearly distinguish
between their expectations of friends and family,179 or, alternatively, friends and
family may “play[] rather similar roles.”180 It is this second category, where
friends and family are comparable, that provides space for donor-conceived
174. Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 191; see also Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 631, 632–33 (2007) (documenting the absence of legal regulation of friendship more gener-
ally).
175. See Clare Huntington, Happy Families? Translating Positive Psychology into Family Law, 16
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 385, 395–96 (2009) (discussing the need for family law to recognize family
support networks).
176. E.g., Roseneil, supra note 172; Charles Q. Strohm et al., “Living Apart Together” Relation-
ships in the United States, 21 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 177, 178 (2009), available at http://www.demographic-
research.org/volumes/vol21/7/21-7.pdf. Irene Levin traces the term to a 1978 Dutch newspaper article.
Irene Levin, Living Apart Together: A New Family Form, 52 CURRENT SOC. 223, 227 (2004).
177. Strohm et al., supra note 176, at 200.
178. Id. at 199. Moreover, “heterosexuals in LAT unions place a higher value on independence and
are more likely to expect both partners to contribute to paid work and family care giving, compared to
married people.” Id. at 202.
179. Many people continue to live in families where the primary focus is interacting with other kin;
that is, some families, especially in the working class world, live in communities that revolve around
kin interaction. See, e.g., ANNETTE LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS: CLASS, RACE, AND FAMILY LIFE 204–06
(2003); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 165–70
(2010).
180. Ray Pahl & Liz Spencer, Personal Communities: Not Simply Families of ‘Fate’ or ‘Choice,’ 52
CURRENT SOC. 199, 215 (2004). Pahl and Spencer define “personal communities” as those which
“represent people’s significant personal relationships and include bonds which give both structure and
meaning to their lives.” LIZ SPENCER & RAY PAHL, RETHINKING FRIENDSHIP: HIDDEN SOLIDARITIES TODAY 45
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family communities.
The psychological and social support from friendship can provide tangible
benefits.181 Friendship may also have negative consequences; for example,
social influence based on friendship is one explanation for the obesity epidemic
in the United States.182 In their in-depth study of friendships, sociologists Sasha
Roseneil and Shelley Budgeon found that communities of friends may be more
important to daily life than sexual partnerships, such that “[c]are and support
flow between individuals with no biological, legal or social recognized ties to
each other.”183 They characterize some of the friendships as “ethical prac-
tice[s],” with a corresponding series of responsibilities towards one another.184
The strength and power of such support might provide the basis for imposing
fiduciary obligations on close friendships as recognition of the expectations of
loyalty, good faith, and confidentiality.185 The care that could become subject to
such obligations might be between adults or between adults and children, and
might, for example, involve contracts providing rights to a nonparent for
ongoing caregiving to a child.186 Indeed, recognition of friendship would mean
“that marriage need not be the only site for emotional care and support,”187
thereby opening up other possibilities.
A third challenge to the family as domesticity presumption involves establish-
(2006). They identify a continuum between simple and complex friendship, ranging from “useful
contact” to “soulmate.” Id. at 60. A soulmate need not be a romantic partner.
181. For example, researchers asked study participants to estimate the steepness of a hill. Partici-
pants who were accompanied by a friend estimated the incline to be lower than participants who were
alone. Simone Schnall et al., Social Support and the Perception of Geographical Slant, 44 J. EXPERIMEN-
TAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1246, 1252–53 (2008). Breast cancer survival rates appear to be enhanced by the
existence of a network of social support. See Candyce H. Kroenke et al., Social Networks, Social
Support, and Survival After Breast Cancer Diagnosis, 24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1105 (2006). And
friends help friends live longer. See Julianne Holt-Lunstad, Timothy B. Smith & J. Bradley Layton,
Social Relationships and Mortality Risk: A Meta-Analytic Review, PLOS MED. (July 2010),
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000316;jsessionid
1FEB1AAF83E79A31811CBCA854B74636.ambra02. Furthermore, an individual’s happiness is af-
fected by the happiness of others in the same social network. See NANCY LEVIT & DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE
HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A GOOD LIFE IN THE LAW 90–91 (2010); James H. Fowler & Nicholas A.
Christakis, Dynamic Spread of Happiness in a Large Social Network: Longitudinal Analysis over 20
Years in the Framingham Heart Study, 337 BRIT. MED. J. 2338 (2008).
182. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social
Network over 32 Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 378 (2007). Friends can similarly impact
depression; researchers have found that “not only may depressed mood spread across social ties, but
also that depression depends on how connected individuals are and where they are located within social
networks.” James N. Rosenquist, James H. Fowler & Nicholas A. Christakis, Social Network Determi-
nants of Depression, 16 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 273, 280 (2011).
183. Sasha Roseneil & Shelley Budgeon, Cultures of Intimacy and Care Beyond ‘the Family’:
Personal Life and Social Change in the Early 21st Century, 52 CURRENT SOC. 135, 153 (2004).
184. Id. at 146–48.
185. See Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 703–05 (2010); Ethan J.
Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 699 (2009); see also Leib, supra note 174, at
638–53 (exploring definitions of friends).
186. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 143, at 426–27.
187. Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 240.
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ing paternity for men who have never lived with their children or the mother. If
the parents were not married at the time of the child’s conception or birth, then
state laws allow for paternity to be established voluntarily or in other ways,
such as if the father “held out” the child as his own and lived with the child for
at least two years.188 Cohabiting is thus an important element in establishing (or
disestablishing) paternity. But instead of any requirement of living together, it
could also be possible for a parent to live apart from a child and yet still hold
out the child as his own, comparable to a living apart adult partnership.189
These reconsiderations of the family as domesticity provide an opening for
developing legal categories that recognize additional members of the family
circle. While the domesticated family deserves protection, these other relation-
ships, not based on cohabiting or dependency, may also merit protection.
Although they take radically different forms, these alternative relationships may
function in ways similar to the domesticated family. This, then, serves as one
justification for legal attention. A second justification builds on their differences
from the domesticated family by recognizing that these relationships may need
protection in order to flourish.
C. STRAND 3: ACCORDING RIGHTS TO MULTIPLE PARENTS
A third jurisprudential strand similarly offers a useful analogy for how to
think about donor-family connections because of its analysis and deconstruction
of the meaning of parent. The “multiple parent” literature suggests expanding
the category of those who can qualify as a “legal parent” to include other
caregiving adults under certain carefully controlled circumstances.190 Accord-
ingly, it suggests that more than two individuals may be entitled to quasi-
parental status, showing the possibility of recognizing different legal roles for
caretaking adults.
188. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (2000) (amended 2002); Susan Frelich Appleton,
Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 227, 258 (2006); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607(b) (2000) (amended 2002) (allowing for
paternity presumption to be challenged where, among other elements, the putative father was not
cohabiting with the mother when the child was conceived).
189. The Supreme Court has developed a jurisprudence on the parental rights of men who have not
lived with their children. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
190. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 15–16
(2008); Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 944 (1984)
(suggesting that, if the nuclear family has dissolved, then “nonexclusive parenthood” would offer
parental rights and entitlements to an individual who had developed a parent–child relationship with the
child); Carbone & Cahn, supra note 144, at 238–39 (discussing courts’ approaches to the idea of
“multiple parents”); Kessler, supra note 149, at 49 (proposing the concept of “community parenting,”
or families with more than two parents); Polikoff, Redefining Parenthood, supra note 148, at 464
(arguing for an expansion of parenthood to recognize functional parents); Polikoff, supra note 10, at
206–07.
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Courts have historically tried to find two—but only two—parents per child,191
and to diligently protect parental rights.192 Under the traditional view, parent-
hood is a unitary bundle of rights that is: (1) exclusive, meaning that there can
be only one set of parents; and (2) a zero sum game, in that legal recognition of
one set of parents, as in adoption, precludes any further relationship between the
child and her biological parents.193 Courts are tentatively starting to recognize
the possibility of three parents,194 and the multiple parent approach finds some
expression in the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of Family Dissolu-
tion. The ALI definition of parents identifies three different categories: legal
parents, “parents by estoppel” (or equitable parents), and de facto parents.195
Individuals who are not legal parents but who satisfy a strict set of criteria can
qualify for a varying range of the rights and obligations of parenthood based on
their commitments or obligations to children.196 Nonetheless, the legal parent
retains substantial control over the status of parents by estoppel and de facto
parents, because of the requirement that she acquiesce or consent before individu-
als can qualify.197
Recognition of these different classes facilitates the corresponding identifica-
tion of more than two parents, albeit with varying rights. Indeed, it might be
possible to construct a category that accords legal significance to caregiving
without using the label “parent.”198 Modern psychological theory also supports
the recognition and protection of children’s relationships with multiple caretak-
ers. Psychologists now believe that children can form and maintain attachments
to multiple adult caretakers and that neither parental authority nor caretaking
need be exclusive to be effective.199 The concept of “uncleing” provides yet
191. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,
781 n.8 (Cal. 1993). In Johnson, the court acknowledged that multiple parenting was becoming more
common as a result of the increasing number of divorces, but refused to find a third parent.
192. See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1991 (2010); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65–67 (2000).
193. For example, in Michael H., the Court emphatically refused to recognize the claims of the
biological father against the two marital parents. 491 U.S. at 124–26; see also Johnson, 851 P.2d at
781 n.8; Carbone & Cahn, supra note 144, at 238–39 (discussing courts’ rejection of multiple-parent
model).
194. See Murray, supra note 143, at 442–43 (discussing cases). Louisiana recognizes the possibility
of two fathers. See, e.g., Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 854–55 (La. 1989); Warren v. Richard, 296 So.
2d 813, 817 (La. 1974); Rachel L. Kovach, Comment, Sorry Daddy—Your Time Is Up: Rebutting the
Presumption of Paternity in Louisiana, 56 LOY. L. REV. 651, 658 (2010).
195. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.03(1) (2002).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 2.03(1)(b).
198. See Murray, supra note 143, at 447–52; see also Polikoff, supra note 10, at 246 (advocating
recognition of two parents along with legal enforcement of a visitation agreement with, for example, a
sperm donor).
199. See Eleanor Willemsen & Kristen Marcel, Attachment 101 for Attorneys: Implications for
Infant Placement Decisions, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 439, 472 (1996). There are proposals for allowing
close friends to adopt children jointly, thereby tying together the “family as domesticity” and “multiple
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another category for the recognition of significant adults in a child’s life.200 In
adoptions where the biological parents and the child retain contact even after an
adoption has been finalized and the child becomes a legal member of the
adoptive family, the uncleing status would accord some rights to the biological
parent–child relationship, such as inheritance.201 Uncleing status would not
confer custodial, or even visitation, rights, however, and so differs from other
multiple parent proposals.
The multiple parent literature does not necessarily provide a template for
according rights to adults in donor-connected families because it may not be
appropriate to grant parental, caretaking, or inheritance rights based solely on
status, without an opt-in component. Nonetheless, the possibility of different
legal categories of parent suggests changes in the “all-or-nothing” framework
that has typified family law. Similarly, potential legal recognition for donor-
conceived family communities challenges the traditional unitary parent–child
relationship.
IV. THE POTENTIAL FOR LAW
Taken together, the constitutional claims between and among family mem-
bers, the critique of the family as enshrined domesticity, and the recognition of
multiple parents provide possible bases for establishing legal rights in the
donor-conceived family context. They free up some space to expand our notions
of, and protections for, a wider range of relationships. They do not, however,
tell us why the law should provide direct protection to these particular relation-
ships (that is, donor-conceived family communities). Indeed, the lack of explicit
recognition of these relationships does not mean they are prohibited but may
instead allow them to flourish. It may be that no explicit laws are needed, so
developing and imposing a specific legal framework would not provide any
benefits. The lack of direct regulation has a profound influence on what is not
regulated, so state regulation might complicate, and slow, the development of
these affective ties, as well as have undesired effects on other relationships.
These matters might more appropriately be settled by contracts (albeit ones that
would be legally enforceable). Particularly because these relationships seem, to
many people, to exist as somewhat less essential relationships than other family
law relationships, and because there is no social consensus on how to approach
them, then they may not be ripe for legal regulation.202 Accordingly, it is
parent” jurisprudential strands. See, e.g., Jessica R. Feinberg, Friends as Co-Parents, 43 U.S.F. L. REV.
799, 801–02 (2009).
200. See E. Gary Spitko, Open Adoption, Inheritance, and the “Uncleing” Principle, 48 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 765, 768 (2008).
201. Id. at 788.
202. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Regulating at the Margins: Non-Traditional Kinship and the Legal
Regulation of Intimate and Family Life, ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1932743 (arguing that laws that appear limited to one
group indirectly affect other groups). This is an important recognition, but distinct from the critical
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important to acknowledge what might be lost in legal regulation, particularly at
this early stage when the social ties are still being developed. Issues include
whether the law should intervene now or allow some social consensus to
develop, whether imposing law would promote or short-circuit a social experi-
ment, and whether regulation might result in further development or would lead
to unwelcome intervention into developing family forms with collateral effects
on other families. Consequently, the second step of this analysis, undertaken in
this Part, involves an exploration of why the law might step in to provide
guidelines and protection for these relationships.
The state may want to protect friendships, for example, because important
caretaking happens within them. Similarly, important caretaking and bonding
occur within donor-conceived relationships. Of course, any potential regulation
must account for the tremendous variation in the import that different people
attach to these relationships, and the very different expectations and relation-
ships that come out of them. Numerous analogies provide potential “homes” for
legal regulation of donor-conceived family communities. The looming question
is whether these families should be regulated under the law, and the next section
provides reasons to move forward. As this Article discusses, new regulation
should provide space and support for these relationships to develop by establish-
ing a voluntary registry to allow for half-siblings and their families to connect,
by supporting any resulting connections, by allowing offspring to learn the
identity of their donors when they reach the age of eighteen, and by limiting the
number of offspring from any particular donor.
A. REASONS TO REGULATE
One reason to regulate is an expressed need on behalf of some of these
families for guidance, as poignantly suggested by the confusion that many
donor families feel on how to proceed to find connections with others, and then
what to do once they are found.203 The law could provide parameters to foster
and nurture donor-conceived family communities while also protecting against
unwanted contact. Regulation need not mandate conformity, such as requiring
contact between siblings, but instead might provide opportunities that do not
currently exist. It could also provide recognition for the rights of those ne-
glected under the current system. By not protecting those interests, the law
affirmatively serves to reinforce a particular normative vision of whose rights
are most important. A second reason to regulate is to provide certainty and
predictability, unlike the current system, which only allows for extrajudicial
means of connection through, for example, the Internet or policies of specific
understanding, discussed above, that the lack of direct regulation nonetheless affects relationships that
seemingly exist outside regulation.
203. See supra text accompanying note 98.
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gamete providers.204 The law could provide more clarity on the legal rights and
obligations of all members of donor-conceived family communities. Moreover,
as the donor-conceived begin advocacy efforts through the legislative process
and court systems,205 and as other countries face advocacy efforts and imple-
ment radically different frameworks,206 the existing American system faces
increasing pressure.207
Finally, explicit regulation that helps develop donor-conceived family commu-
nities can help families, and family law, constructively realize their goals of
promoting intimacy and protection for emotional connections. The law’s silence
about these families provides space for only limited contact, perhaps reflecting a
normative view that these are medicalized interactions rather than familial
connections. Based on this perspective, it is sperm banks, egg agencies, and
individuals interested in contact who establish the parameters of these communi-
ties, using frameworks established by contracts and health law. Indeed, as the
former president of one of the leading fertility clinic trade associations ex-
plained, “when these decisions are made by donor and a parent, the child
doesn’t have a say.”208
If this is a societal choice to make decisions without considering the child’s
interest, then it is useful to acknowledge such a perspective so that members of
204. Among other problems with the existing, ad hoc system, donor-conceived people may not
know where to register, they may have inadequate information about their donor because no records
were maintained, or banks may have gone out of existence.
205. See, e.g., DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY, supra note 71. Although no donor-conceived individual has
yet brought suit in the United States to discover information about a donor or potential half-siblings,
Olivia Pratten successfully brought a lawsuit in British Columbia, claiming that she was entitled to
disclosure of the identity of her donor based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantee
of personal equality and security. Pratten v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), 2011 BCSC 656 (Can. B.C.
Sup. Ct.), available at http://www.cbc.ca/bc/news/bc-110519-pratten-sperm-donor-ruling.pdf; see also
Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim ¶¶ 25, 30, Pratten v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), 2011
BCSC 656 (Can. B.C.), available at http://www.arvayfinlay.com/news/Writ%20of%20Summons
%20and%20Statement%20of%20Claim.pdf. Joanna Rose, in the United Kingdom, argued that she was
legally entitled to the name of her sperm donor “father.” Rose v. Sec’y of State for Health, [2002] 2
F.L.R. 962, ¶¶ 38, 47 (U.K); see also Joanna Rose, A Critical Analysis of Sperm Donation Practices:
The Personal and Social Effects of Disrupting the Unity of Biological and Social Relatedness for the
Offspring 235 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.nla.gov.au/openpublish/
index.php/aja/article/viewFile/1687/2048 (discussing author’s court case). It was in part a response to
her case that the U.K. enacted legislation allowing donor-conceived offspring access to identifying
information. In the United States, donor gamete recipients, but not their children, have brought suit
based on medical issues. Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Doe v.
XYZ Co., 914 N.E.2d 117 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009).
206. The British system, for example, allows for disclosure once the offspring reach the age of
eighteen. See What You Can Find Out About Your Donor or Donor-Conceived Genetic Siblings, HUM.
FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., http://www.hfea.gov.uk/112.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2011).
207. See Alison Motluk, Canadian Court Bans Anonymous Sperm and Egg Donation, NATURE NEWS
(May 27, 2011), http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110527/full/news.2011.329.html (“[The Pratten de-
cision] may galvanise the offspring of American donors to attempt a similar challenge.”).
208. David Crary, Sperm-Donors’ Kids Seek More Rights and Respect, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 15, 2010,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2010/08/15/sperm_donors_kids_seek_more_rights_and_
respect/ (quoting Dr. Jamie Grifo, former President of the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technolo-
gies) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the donor world understand that the law will not encourage them to develop
connections. Nonetheless, the very different presumptions in adoption,209 the
nascent development of pressure from members of the donor-conceived, the
very different regulatory framework established in other countries, and the early
stirrings of lawsuits putting pressure on the existing system, together challenge
the normative framework pursuant to which these communities are best left to
regulation by health law and contracts. Existing regulations of reproductive
technology, focused on gamete safety or truth in advertising, cater only to the
parents as patients, not to the families they are creating.
On the other hand, legal support for these families is not an entirely positive
good and, particularly in areas involving the intersection of sex, family, and
intimacy, there is healthy skepticism of state regulation, even well-intentioned
state regulation.210 These families may not be better off with a regulatory
scheme and, indeed, may derive pleasure and benefit in being able to form
relationships outside of the law. Families are finding each other and are develop-
ing affective ties, so there may be no need to put these ties into a legal
framework and, indeed, these families may affirmatively benefit from resisting
state regulation. Rather than “indulg[ing] the misplaced view that, if something
important is at stake, law should regulate it,”211 we might instead not regulate,
thereby allowing these new networks to develop on their own and helping to
destabilize existing conceptions of the traditional family.
Indeed, the law clearly has an impact on behavior,212 and new laws (or the
lack thereof) will affect people’s perceptions of donor-conceived family relation-
ships and their actual experiences of them. If, for example, there are laws that
accord these relationships some legal significance, this may encourage more
people to find their donor-conceived family communities. Consider a law
granting an offspring the right to know her donor; this makes donation less
secretive because no one is able to choose anonymous donation. The legal
parent may also find it more difficult to conceal the donation from the child in
this new environment. If the parent does not disclose the fact of donor concep-
tion, then the child will be all the more angry if and when she finds out because
the law accords her a right to know the actual donor, and yet her parent kept the
existence of the donation a secret. Legal regulation changes the subject that is
209. See generally CAHN, supra note 138, at 14 (contrasting differing orientations of adoption and
ART); Annette Ruth Appell, Reflections on the Movement Toward a More Child-Centered Adoption, 32
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2010) (urging greater attention to children in adoption).
210. See, e.g., Cahill, supra note 202; Ertman, supra note 57, at 22; Katherine M. Franke,
Commentary, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1419 (2004)
[hereinafter Franke, Domesticated Liberty]; Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2685, 2688 (2008) [hereinafter Franke, Longing for Loving].
211. Franke, Longing for Loving, supra note 210, at 2703.
212. In the adoption context, thousands of adopted adults file for access to their original birth
certificates when states enact legislation allowing them access. See Cahn, supra note 75, at 321–22.
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being regulated, establishing norms of appropriate behaviors.213
Two responses to the risks of legal regulations show the importance of
developing new approaches: first, even in the absence of explicit regulation, the
law still defines the space for flourishing.214 And second, the benefits from the
normative vision articulated may justify the costs of the regulation. A normative
vision of promoting affective ties, fairness, and other public goods215 associated
with respect for the dignity of donor-conceived families and their communities
supports one type of regulation, while a normative vision associated with
protecting patient autonomy, privacy, and the domesticated family supports a
different type of regulation. This Article aspires to provide a basis for regulation
based on recognition of the dignity of connection between donor families (as
well as the dignity of those involved in creating these families).
B. HOW TO REGULATE
Accordingly, in recognition of the possibility of emotional connection,216 the
state should provide some protections for donor-conceived family communities.
Conceptualizing these potential networks as relational entities with emotional
interconnections provides a basis for developing a new legal framework. Even
within traditional family law, there is a growing appreciation that relationships
continue even after a family dissolves, that parents may still need to talk to each
other once they are no longer married or living together, that children’s relation-
ships with both parents matter.217 The increasing number of challenges to the
binary nature of family law—parent/nonparental caregiver, spouse/nonspouse,
sibling/nonsibling218—indicate the need for a more nuanced approach that
213. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, 59 EMORY L.J. 1103, 1156–59
(2010); see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (defining norms as informal social and cultural expectations with which people
feel they must comply).
214. As Elizabeth Emens points out in a different context, “[e]ven when seemingly uninvolved in
intimate discrimination, the state creates infrastructure and influences hierarchies in ways that deter-
mine whom we meet (accidents) and how we view those we meet (calculations).” Elizabeth F. Emens,
Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307,
1401 (2009).
215. See generally MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S
POLITICAL IDEALS (2010) (discussing the relationship between supporting families and the public good);
Huntington, supra note 143 (addressing the role of family law in healing families).
216. In a series of cases beginning in 1972, the Supreme Court held that biological, nonmarital
fathers had a constitutionally protected interest in establishing a relationship with their children, and
later cases have clarified that this right exists when the men had taken some steps to develop a
relationship with the children. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972); Ristroph &
Murray, supra note 1, at 1252–53; Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to
Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1400 (2010).
217. See Huntington, supra note 143, at 1287–94.
218. Id. at 1304 (noting, in the context of dissolved familial relationships, that “[r]ather than wishing
that a clear legal name—spouse/legal stranger, parent/nonparent—will resolve the underlying psychologi-
cal issues, the new legal status acknowledges the ongoing connection that exists and thus conceives of a
place beyond rupture”). See generally Huntington, supra note 175 (exploring how the law can respect
positive emotions within the family).
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recognizes and allows various levels of connection. Focusing not on individual
rights but on potential relationships and emotions among people might provide
a space for fostering donor family communities. Families, both donor and
nondonor, are inevitably embedded in larger structures of care and support,219
and allowing one donor-conceived family to connect with another is consistent
with this realization.220
The law should respond at two critical points: first, it should clarify the legal
relationships between donors, recipients, and offspring; and second, it should
facilitate connections between donor-conceived families who share the same
genetic heritage along with the donors themselves. While most states have laws
on the relationship between sperm donors and recipients, fewer states have
enacted laws on egg donors, and even fewer on embryo donation.221 Regardless
of any other proposal in this Article, donors must be assured that they will have
no parental rights or obligations unless they have arranged otherwise.222 This
certainty encourages contact based on the knowledge of all involved that donors
will not become responsible for child support or able to assert custody and
visitation with respect to any of their donor-conceived offspring.
Once these families are created, laws can facilitate and regulate these connec-
tions; a few areas for legal intervention show that donor-conceived family
communities are different, but nonetheless entitled to some form of legal
recognition and protection. Legal decision makers should take affirmative steps
to facilitate the recognition of these families, according them privileges based
simply on status. For example, the state accords multiple benefits to couples
based on marriage, ranging from tax treatment to surrogate decision-making
authority in the case of illness to intestacy preferences.223 The state might
accord similar benefits to donor-conceived families, such as mandatory disclo-
sure of identifying information to facilitate connections, delegation of surrogate
The ALI’s articulation of different categories of parents, discussed supra notes 195–97 and accompa-
nying text, provides an example of the potentially dissolving binaries in parenthood.
219. See EICHNER, supra note 215; Huntington, supra note 175, at 408; see also WILLIAMS, supra
note 179 (discussing the importance of kinship ties to working-class families).
220. Of course, the recipient parents might think, “Why do I have to think about a third party when
straight, married, fertile people don’t have to share their children with anyone?” The answer is that
straight, married, fertile people have not created their children through the deliberate use of a third
party. Moreover, the recipient parents remain the legal parents and are not required to share, nor
relinquish, those rights.
221. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. And, of course, the laws that do exist do not
cover all contingencies.
222. See, e.g., In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1042 (Kan. 2007); Polikoff, supra note 10, at 241–42.
223. For discussions of benefits based on marital status, see, for example, Gill v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379–83 (D. Mass. 2010); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941, 948 (Mass. 2003); Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
to Honorable Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 23, 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d04353r.pdf. Surrogate decision making most commonly takes the form of substituted
judgments when one partner is medically incapacitated.
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authority for health care decision making,224 or inclusion in Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) protections.225 Under the existing system, donor-conceived
families can already designate other community members as agents for health
care and financial decision making. New laws could, however, expand the rights
available even in the absence of these specific designations. One option might
be to allow members of donor-conceived family communities to enter into a
status comparable to designated beneficiaries under some state laws. For ex-
ample, Colorado provides for a “designated beneficiary” agreement.226 The
Colorado legislation is limited to same-sex couples, as well as other couples
legally prohibited from marrying one another, but, once registered, the couples
are eligible for such benefits as health insurance, inheritance rights, and retire-
ment benefits. It is notable for the ease with which couples can enter and exit
the legal status, and the freedom parties have to define the scope of the
relationship and rights conferred to their partners; partners are free to choose
which rights and protections they want to extend to one another and there is no
requirement of reciprocity.
The purpose is not to create a new legal status that is identical or substantially
similar to that of domestic partners, marriage, or even all of the rights and
privileges accorded to family members.227 The state and federal governments
should not accord legal recognition in a way that is even remotely comparable
to the government’s recognition of the family, such as the automatic conferral of
a series of rights, duties, and obligations. Instead, the goal is to allow members
of donor-conceived family communities to opt in to these rights and duties
through voluntary designation of a specified legal status.
Moreover, advocacy to expand benefits might cause the underlying laws to
change. For example, the federal FMLA is limited in scope and application; its
grudging support for families reflects a compromise in which employers had a
significant voice. The Act only covers employers with fifty or more workers,
and employees only become eligible after one year of work. They are then
entitled to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave from work for medical
reasons related to a spouse, child, or parent.228 It does not allow siblings to take
leave (so would not, on its own terms, apply to half-siblings).
The most fundamental change requires a paradigm shift towards donor-
224. For a sample list of surrogate decision makers, see, for example, ALA. CODE § 22-8A-11(d)(7)
(LexisNexis 2006); see also Ashley Bassel, Note, Order at the End of Life: Establishing a Clear and
Fair Mechanism for the Resolution of Futility Disputes, 63 VAND. L. REV. 491, 501–02 (2010)
(discussing surrogate decision-making statutes).
225. These are some of the benefits that might be accorded to legally recognized friendships. See,
e.g., Leib, supra note 174, 694–705; Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 204–05.
226. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105 (West 2011); see also David D. Meyer, Fragmentation and
Consolidation in the Law of Marriage and Same-Sex Relationships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 115 (2010).
227. For a nice accounting of how the state recognizes the rights accorded to family partners, see
Appling v. Doyle, No. 10-CV-4434 (Wis. Cir. Ct. June 20, 2011), available at http://data.lambdalegal.org/
in-court/downloads/appling_wi_20110620_decision-and-order.pdf.
228. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 825.122(c)(3) (2011).
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conceived family communities: they must take their place in the jurisprudence
of family law and constitutional law, not solely in the administrative jurispru-
dence of technology, health, and safety regulation. They have been medical-
ized,229 rather than humanized. In the context of technology regulation, the law
has focused on gametes and the fertility industry by, for example, developing
standards that test gametes for various health risks.230 The focus of the health
context is protecting patients.231 Legal scholars have discussed the utility of
breach of warranty concepts in the donor-gamete context.232 These interven-
tions are important, but they are technical, focused on the product itself, and not
what the product creates.
This Part argues that future regulation must develop from the perspective of
holistic family law. This grounding provides a more coherent and cohesive
justification for moving forward towards recognition of these new relationships.
Importantly, family law cannot be imported, full-scale, onto these new family
networks.233 There remain critical distinctions. But the basic insight, that the
focus must be on relationships and potentially differing interests as well as on
products, points towards more human, and humane, legal approaches. Legal
treatment of the donor-conceived family and community relationships in repro-
ductive technology might draw on legal treatment of adoptive relationships,
with its focus on children and other relational interests.234 Given a state goal to
foster institutions that sustain family,235 various guiding principles help struc-
ture the framework for these new policies. First, the state must give explicit
recognition to donor-conceived family communities, acknowledging the emo-
tional and biological connections that exist between members of these communi-
ties. Second, beyond this recognition, the state must adopt a position that is
either neutral towards, or that affirmatively facilitates, these communities.
This guidance provides the basis for the recommendations developed in this
Part, which focus on additional regulation of the fertility industry and further
facilitation of the integrity of the family networks. Specific recommendations
229. See ALMELING, supra note 15, at 3–4, 27; CONRAD, supra note 102.
230. CAHN, supra note 23, at 55–59.
231. See, e.g., William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the Widening Gap
Between Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497, 503–05 (2008)
(discussing medical ethics); William D. White, Market Forces, Competitive Strategies, and Health Care
Regulation, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 137 (discussing market competition); Stephanie N. Sivinski, Note,
Putting Too Many (Fertilized) Eggs in One Basket: Methods of Reducing Multifetal Pregnancies in the
United States, 88 TEX. L. REV. 897, 913 (2010) (discussing focus on patient autonomy).
232. E.g., Reich & Swink, supra note 58, at 43–49; Dawn R. Swink & J. Brad Reich, Caveat
Vendor: Potential Progeny, Paternity, and Product Liability Online, 2007 BYU L. REV. 857, 879–85.
233. See infra section IV.C (Important Objections) for further discussion.
234. Adoption law has moved towards increasing recognition of the child’s right to learn about her
biological parents, and towards enforcement of agreements for contact between the biological parents
and the child. See, e.g., Annette R. Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection: Heteronormativ-
ity, Same-Sex Parenting and the Lessons of Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 289, 290 (2008); Appell, supra
note 209, at 7.
235. See, e.g., EICHNER, supra note 215.
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include requiring the entire fertility industry to engage in better record-keeping;
allowing donor-conceived offspring to learn their origins, the identity of the
donor, and the existence of any siblings; setting limits on the number of children
born from any gamete provider; and developing a new familial-type status that
donor-conceived family communities might choose to assume. What is clear is
that family law and health scholars and advocates should begin considering how
to nurture these newly developing families.
1. Regulation for Health, Safety, and Welfare
The regulations that do exist for the fertility industry focus on safety and
protecting consumers.236 Patients absolutely need assurances that gametes have
been tested for various diseases, and that fertility clinics are not engaging in
false advertising. Indeed, infertility is a medical condition, to be sure, but it is
also a social condition.237 Regulations that are primarily concerned with inform-
ing patients, however, are limited in scope. They do not address any other
aspect of the donor world.
Applying a new paradigm means that the fertility industry, including clinics,
sperm banks, and egg donor brokers, needs further incentives to ensure the best
interests of donor-conceived families and their communities. This principle
leads to a reconsideration of existing approaches to ensure that relational
interests are a critical factor in formulating law and policy. Legislatures must
require improved record-keeping, limits on the numbers of children born per
donor, and more thorough counseling and disclosure to parents and donors.238
More specifically, as a fundamental first step, clinics and banks must keep
track of the children who result from any particular egg or sperm donor, and
report this information to a central registry. Parents who had used gametes could
be required to report to the fertility clinic or to the birthing hospital identifying
details about the gamete provider and any resulting births, and the sperm banks
and medical care providers could be responsible for ensuring accurate reporting.
Only with improved data collection and retention can meaningful changes
result. Additional information, such as genetic data, could also be collected
about donors to support potential regulation on repetitious donations.239 Counsel-
236. See Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-493, 106 Stat.
3146 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to a-7 (2006)) (requiring ART programs to report
“pregnancy success rates” to the Centers for Disease Control and for those rates to be published); 21
C.F.R. §§ 1271.1–1271.440 (2011) (concerning donor eligibility and testing); Heled, supra note 100, at
249–55.
237. See, e.g., KAREY HARWOOD, THE INFERTILITY TREADMILL: FEMINIST ETHICS, PERSONAL CHOICE, AND
THE USE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (2007).
238. Congress has served as the primary outside regulator for gamete donation. Similarly, a federal
structure could more efficiently and effectively implement any large-scale collection of information and
oversight of the process. See Cahn, supra note 146, at 218–19.
239. Given the purpose of collecting DNA records, whether any genetic data collected would
thereafter be available to offspring presents entirely different issues; certainly, non-donor-conceived
offspring do not have access to such data about their parents.
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ing and informed consent procedures should ensure that all participants under-
stand not just the medical procedures, but also the social and psychological
consequences of the gamete donor process.240
Importantly, these steps are possible; the industry has, for example, already
recommended voluntary limits on the number of offspring per donor.241 Limits
already exist in numerous other countries, and the industry’s voluntary limits
may be the most appropriate basis for legislation in the United States.242
Although parents are not required to report the birth of a child using donor
gametes, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention already collect informa-
tion on the success of ART procedures involving eggs and embryos; this
collection could be expanded to include information about sperm as well as the
number of children born. Other countries have required the specific regulatory
body responsible for ART or an independent agency to maintain this
information;243 the precise form of entity, its means for protecting confidential-
ity, and the length of time during which records must be kept will depend on
political factors as well as other responsibilities that such an organization might
acquire. Even those opposed to any further regulation or disclosure of identify-
ing information should recognize the importance of ensuring that one donor
does not populate the world nor that genetically related offspring do not marry
each other.
While each of these steps could be justified based on health and safety
concerns involved in using ART,244 they gain additional strength because of
their interrelationship with a standard that focuses on the best interests of
offspring.245 Indeed, a family law framework would focus not only on the
offspring’s interests, but on other public goods as well, such as the promotion of
240. For suggestions, see, for example, American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 42 FAM. L.Q. 171, 178–79, 182–83 (2008) (proposing requirements of
informed consent and types of potential counseling); Durrell, supra note 30, at 212–13 (discussing
flaws in informed consent process); Suter, supra note 30, at 244–46 (same).
In Australia, for example, some jurisdictions recommend counseling for intending parents that
includes the legal, social, and psychological implications of using a donor as well as the impact on the
parents’ relationship to each other. SENATE LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS REFERENCES COMM., DONOR
CONCEPTION PRACTICES IN AUSTRALIA 60–61 (2011), http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/
donor_conception/report/report.pdf.
241. Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 31, at S195; Practice Comm. of
the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med. & Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech., supra note
29, at S35–S36.
242. See generally Cahn, supra note 139 (justifying the need for limits and discussing the experi-
ences of other countries).
243. Eric Blyth & Lucy Frith, Donor-Conceived People’s Access to Genetic and Biographical
History: An Analysis of Provisions in Different Jurisdictions Permitting Disclosure of Donor Identity,
23 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 174, 178–79 (2009).
244. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 139.
245. But see I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (draft on
file with author) [hereinafter Cohen, Beyond Best Interests]; I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction:
The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (draft on file with author)
[hereinafter Cohen, Regulating Reproduction]. For further discussion of the “best interest” argument,
see infra text accompanying notes 296–97.
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human capabilities and support for a family’s communities.246 Moreover, fur-
ther regulation provides a backdrop towards additional means for recognizing
both children’s interests and the familial relationships.
2. Identity Interests
Recognizing the development of donor-conceived family communities and
children’s interests in identity, the donor-conceived should be able to find out
the identity of their donors and their biologically related “siblings.” To acknowl-
edge the potential connection between gamete providers, the recipients, and
their children, federal and state law should provide for limited disclosure of the
donor’s identity once offspring turn eighteen.247 Laws guaranteeing the release
of such information to mature adults would preempt private agreements (such as
between the gamete provider and the intending parents or between the gamete
provider and a gamete bank) to the contrary. Although all states have addressed
this issue for adoptees, albeit without necessarily accepting open records,248 few
states have considered legislation on disclosure of the identity of gamete
providers. Washington State enacted legislation in 2011 that is a first, albeit
problematic, step towards this goal.249 While the new law allows the donor-
conceived access to identifying information when they reach the age of eigh-
teen, it also permits the donor to file a disclosure veto, thereby precluding
access.250 This veto power, however, significantly undercuts any assertion of
246. See, e.g., EICHNER, supra note 215, at 68–70 (discussing the possibility of changing the state’s
role from neutral protector of individual rights to active supporter of “caretaking and human develop-
ment”).
247. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 146, at 217–21; Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The
Case for Non-Anonymous Gamete Donation, 21 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 24–27 (2008). But see Sauer, supra
note 168, 939–43. It may even be appropriate to allow for disclosure at an earlier age. See Blyth &
Frith, supra note 243, at 186–87 (discussing range of ages for disclosure internationally); cf. Vivian
Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, Cognitive Development, and the Age of Electoral Majority (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/vivian_hamilton/4/ (arguing for moving vot-
ing age back to sixteen).
248. See JEANNE A. HOWARD ET AL., EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, FOR THE RECORDS II: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE HISTORY AND IMPACT OF ADULT ADOPTEE ACCESS TO ORIGINAL BIRTH CERTIFICATES
(2010), http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications/7_14_2010_ForTheRecordsII.pdf; Naomi Cahn
& Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 150, 162 (1999). Virtually all states allow adoptees access to their original birth certificates
based on a showing in court of good cause, and a number of states allow access without requiring
adoptees to go to court. See HOWARD ET AL., supra, at 31–32.
249. 2011 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 283, § 53 (West) (available online at Westlaw’s tentative classifica-
tion, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.0001).
250. Id. § 53(2)(a). For a history of the legislation, see H.B. 1267-2011-12: Clarifying and
Expanding the Rights and Obligations of State Registered Domestic Partners and Other Couples
Related to Parentage, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, http://apps.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/summary.aspx
?bill1267 (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). The bill’s primary focus is the parentage of children conceived
by assisted reproduction, but it also directs that anyone who provides sperm or eggs to a fertility clinic
in the state must also provide identifying information and a medical history. While that is, in fact, a
customary practice for most fertility clinics, another part of the law will allow children born from
donated gametes to return to the fertility clinic when they reach the age of eighteen to request the
identifying information and the medical history. 2011 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 283, § 53(a)–(b) (West).
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offspring’s right to know the identity of their donors, and is a critical flaw. A
related proposal is the establishment of a national, federal voluntary registry
that would allow for connections between family members prior to offspring
reaching the age of eighteen.251
One potential objection to the first proposal is that mandating the release of
identifying information might be contrary to agreements between donors and
sperm banks or fertility clinics.252 Prospectively, of course, this would not
present problems;253 retroactive application, however, might be problematic.
Nonetheless, in other contexts, courts and legislatures have reformed or struck
down agreements that are deemed to be contrary to public policy or in violation
of constitutionally protected rights.254 In the adoption context, several states
have provided that regardless of private agreements, adopted adults will receive
access to information about their birth parents.255 When no-fault divorce was
first enacted, disappointed spouses claimed that the state could not retroactively
Regardless of whether the donor files a disclosure veto that prevents the clinic from revealing the
identifying information, the donor offspring will still be entitled to the medical information. Id.
§ 53(2)(b).
251. This has been done by some states for adoptees, allowing the biological parents and the adoptee
to indicate their interest in contacting one another. See Cahn & Singer, supra note 248, at 162–63.
Approximately thirty states have established these registries. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ACCESS TO ADOPTION RECORDS: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 4 (2009),
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/infoaccessapall.pdf. Although Senator
Carl Levin has repeatedly introduced proposals for a national registry (and I testified in favor of such a
registry), the legislation has never been enacted. Cahn & Singer, supra note 248, at 163 n.59.
252. A second objection relates to the privacy interests of all involved. See infra text accompanying
notes 309–23 (discussing privacy interests).
253. Indeed, when Britain moved to full disclosure, it did so prospectively only. HUM. FERTILISATION
& EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., supra note 206; Eric Blyth et al., Wither the HFEA and the Fate of Donor
Registers?, BIONEWS (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_69470.asp. The judge in Prat-
ten similarly limited her ruling to prospective application. Pratten v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.),
2011 BCSC 656, ¶¶ 330–35 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.), available at http://www.cbc.ca/bc/news/bc-110519-
pratten-sperm-donor-ruling.pdf.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 141–45 (discussing K.M. v. E.G.). As another example,
surrogacy contracts have been struck down as contrary to public policy. E.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d
1227, 1234, 1240–50 (N.J. 1988) (invalidating surrogacy agreement); Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and
the Politics of Commodification, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at 109. Similarly, where
agreements violate legal rights, they are struck down; perhaps the best known example involves racially
restrictive covenants. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v.
Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451 (2007). See generally Russell
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1203, 1229–30 (2003).
255. See HOWARD ET AL., supra note 248, at 13; Cahn & Singer, supra note 248, at 167–68; E. Wayne
Carp, Does Opening Adoption Records Have an Adverse Social Impact? Some Lessons from the U.S.,
Great Britain, and Australia, 1953–2007, 10 ADOPTION Q., 29, 34–38 (2007); Elizabeth J. Samuels, The
Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of Adult Adoptee Access to Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L.
REV. 367, 380 (2001); Jennifer Butch, Note, Finding Family: Why New Jersey Should Allow Adult
Adoptees Access to Their Original Birth Certificates, 34 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 251, 262–65 (2010).
Although, as discussed above, adoption and ART have developed with different standards, some
analogies can be useful, and the ART world can learn from the adoption world. See, e.g., Cahn & Evan
B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., supra note 8.
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modify their marriage contracts; courts rejected these claims.256 The issue of
retroactivity, which involves a conflict between expectations of donors at the
time of donation and the needs of donor-conceived people, is complex, showing
the importance of starting a new conversation.
Moving towards disclosure respects not only potential relational interests but
also recognizes the autonomy claims of offspring. Moreover, donor-conceived
offspring have also claimed that they are the objects of discrimination because
they do not have access to the identities of their biological parents.257
Even under a system of full disclosure, there certainly remains a critical
distinction between “parenting” a child and contributing gametes to the creation
of the child.258 The legal parents have strong rights to make their own decisions
concerning the control, care, and custody of their children,259 and these deci-
sions may include disclosing details about the child’s origins. Allowing informa-
tion disclosure to adult offspring respects parental rights to raise children as
they see fit while the children are minors, but respects the “children’s” rights
once they are mature.260
While the rights and interests of biological parents and gamete providers
should be accorded respect, these parties have created a new family and a child.
Regulation should also take account of these new entities by, for example,
allowing the child to receive information about the people who helped to create
her. Such a right should be established both retroactively and prospectively,
such that adult offspring who today want information about their biological
backgrounds should be able to obtain it. Additionally, prospective gamete
provision arrangements should proceed in a legal context in which it is under-
256. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217,
252–54 (1990) (discussing cases and their rationales).
257. E.g., Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim ¶¶ 15–26, Pratten v. British Columbia (Att’y
Gen.), 2011 BCSC 656 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.), available at http://www.arvayfinlay.com/news/
Writ%20of%20Summons%20and%20Statement%20of%20Claim.pdf; see also Eric Blyth & Lucy Frith,
The UK’s Gamete Donor ‘Crisis’—A Critical Analysis, 28 CRITICAL SOC. POL’Y 74, 87 (2008) (“[T]here
is . . . an argument concerning parity and non-discrimination that can be advanced in favour of
disclosure of donor identity: that donor-conceived people should not be the only group of people legally
prevented from finding out their biological parentage.”). Indeed, illegal discrimination between the
rights of adopted and donor-conceived individuals to access information about their biological parents
was at the core of the British Columbia Supreme Court’s decision in Pratten. Pratten v. British
Columbia (Att’y Gen.), 2011 BCSC 656, ¶¶ 230–34 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.). A few courts in the United
States have considered requests to disclose a donor’s identity but never in the context of offsprings’
liberty claims; so far, no court has ordered disclosure. See, e.g., Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr.
2d 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Doe v. XYZ Co., 914 N.E.2d 117 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009); Cahn, supra note
146, at 211–12.
258. See Polikoff, Redefining Parenthood, supra note 148, at 472–73.
259. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1225, 1235–37 (1999); cf. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”
Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992).
260. See Cahn & Singer, supra note 248, at 172–75. The child’s right to an identity is protected
internationally as well. See generally Jennifer A. Baines, Note, Gamete Donors and Mistaken Identi-
ties: The Importance of Genetic Awareness and Proposals Favoring Donor Identity Disclosure for
Children Born from Gamete Donations in the United States, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 116, 120–21 (2007).
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stood that offspring will have access to information once they become adults.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has suggested, in the context of transracial adop-
tion, the need for a child to be able to “claim her ‘identity of origin,’ defined as
a right to know and explore, commensurate with her evolving capacity for
autonomy, her identity as a member of the family and group into which she was
born.”261 Applying this notion more generally in the gamete provision context,
mature offspring in these families similarly need access to the ability to explore
their biological families of origin. The new paradigm suggests that donor-
conceived offspring be able to obtain information about others conceived
through the same gametes. Already in the United Kingdom, New South Wales
(Australia), and New Zealand, offspring are entitled to information about
whether any other individuals share the same donor gametes and, based on
mutual consent, to identifying information about each other.262
The release of identifying information requires legal clarity on the relation-
ship between donors and the families they help create. In the absence of a
written agreement, a donor should not be a parent.263 For all of the other
recommendations to be realistic options, donors and recipient parents must be
reassured that donors have no other kind of legal relationship to their offspring.
Otherwise, contact between donors and offspring becomes highly problematic,
raising potential issues of financial liability and enforceable custodial rights.264
3. Legal Status
Once connections have been made, the newly formed donor-conceived fam-
ily communities may want more formal respect for their relationship. This does
not mean according parental status or providing all of the affirmative legal
261. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Are You My Mother?”: Conceptualizing Children’s Identity
Rights in Transracial Adoptions, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 107, 128 (1995); see also MARY LYNDON
SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT MATTERS MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLO-
GIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAME-SEX AND UNWED PARENTS 40 (2001). Professor Woodhouse speaks
of the need for children to claim rights with respect to two aspects of their identity: one involves their
identity in the context of their functional, social family, and the second is their “identity of origin.”
Woodhouse, supra, at 127–28. Maxine Eichner notes that the state has an obligation to ensure “the
development of children’s civic virtues and autonomy.” EICHNER, supra note 215, at 133.
262. See Blyth & Frith, supra note 243, at 182–83; HFEA To Help Donor-Conceived Siblings
Contact Each Other, HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH. (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/
5838.html. If the government is collecting this information, there is a risk that genetic prescreening may
be required in order to prevent against inadvertent incest. The government’s role here, however, should
be as a registry, rather than an active intervenor.
263. See Polikoff, Breaking the Link, supra note 148.
264. Of course, even without any legal connection, a phone call from an offspring could easily open
the door to all sorts of emotional complexities. Furthermore, despite the lack of a legal obligation to
provide financial support, many people would be unable to turn down a request for help should one of
their offspring come knocking, or would at least prefer not being drawn into a situation where they
would have to decide whether to turn down a request from a suffering offspring. These emotionally
complex moral issues can be partially addressed through the informed consent process when the donor
provides gametes, with the understanding that attitudes change over time. Clarifying a donor’s status
under the law at least ensures that these moral quandaries do not become legal obligations.
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protections accorded to families under American law. Instead, this might mean,
for example, that donor-conceived family communities could opt into a quasi-
familial status that would provide them with a weaker form of protection.265
Their biological connections could give rise to some limited rights that depend
on context and on choice. As family law increasingly moves towards privatiza-
tion, towards customizing the meaning of family through mechanisms ranging
from open adoption agreements to cohabitation and premarital contracts,266
donor-conceived family communities might be able to choose a weak form of
legal recognition.
While my goal is not to set out a laundry list of policy prescriptions, this new
status could (potentially) provide various privileges and obligations. Members
of connected families might, for example, be eligible to take family and medical
leave for one another,267 to inherit, to act as a surrogate decision maker in cases
of illness, or to serve as a legal guardian in cases where the parents are
incapacitated or have died.268 It might also involve some form of recognition
for sibling associational rights, a step that would have a much broader impact
on child welfare.269 To provide administrative ease, the default rule would
remain that these rights are unavailable in the absence of explicit agreements
otherwise.
C. IMPORTANT OBJECTIONS
These proposals are subject to a series of objections that have been raised in
related contexts. The first argument is that donor-conceived family communities
differ so fundamentally from more traditional families that they deserve differ-
ent legal treatment. The second is that disclosure of identifying information will
decrease the supply of donors without any countervailing benefits. A final set of
concerns relate to the potential for imposition of unwanted relationships, for
undermining the integrity of the donor-conceived family, and for invading the
privacy rights of donors.
265. This discussion focuses on donor-conceived family communities. Once formed, donor-
conceived families are no different from other families in American law (assuming that states resolve
the status of the donor). In the future, it may turn out that donor-conceived family communities want
the same parental-status options and affirmative legal protections accorded to other families. Nothing in
this Article precludes such changes.
266. See MARKEL, COLLINS & LEIB, supra note 66; Singer, supra note 149.
267. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 143, at 451–52 (discussing the costs and benefits of such a
proposal). Ethan Leib suggests a “Friends and Medical Leave Act.” Leib, supra note 174, at 682; see
also ETHAN J. LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRIENDSHIP—AND WHAT THE LAW HAS TO
DO WITH IT 99 (2011).
268. For issues involving surrogate decision making and guardianship, see SUSAN N. GARY, JEROME
BORISON, NAOMI R. CAHN & PAULA A. MONOPOLI, CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES, ch.
13 (2011).
269. See Mandelbaum, supra note 3, at 53–64 (suggesting reforms to recognize sibling associational
rights); Angela Ferraris, Comment, Sibling Visitation as a Fundamental Right in Herbst v. Swan, 39
NEW ENG. L. REV. 715, 744–47 (2005) (noting that sibling association rights might affect child custody
and visitation as well as the child welfare system).
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1. Donor-Conceived Family Communities Are Not Families
Donor-conceived family networks take a very different form from families.
While shared genes may be important in each context, the similarities end there.
Families—even LAT couples—generally involve adults related by emotional
and sexual intimacy, and they may include children related through biology or
legally recognized adoption who share (or, in the case of divorce, have shared)
lives together. Family networks do not involve any adult sexual intimacy, do not
include any past sharing of lives, and involve children unrelated to any parents
in the second family. Finally, such families raise the danger of overemphasizing
one’s genetic identity at the expense of the functional family, or “genetic
essentialism,” the concept that a person is the sum of her genes.
This objection is useful in helping to craft the framework of rights to be
accorded family networks, but otherwise unpersuasive in its effort to deny any
type of familial-type rights. First, the lack of a shared life does count for
something. It suggests, for example, that the range of cohabitants’ rights is
inapplicable in this context.270 There is no shared property that must be ac-
counted for. Parents of one donor-conceived child would have no legal rights to
custody of a child conceived through the same donor.
But second, even if the analogy is not perfect, it does provide a useful way of
thinking about these networks. Gametes form families and create emotional and
social connections. Given the need for administrable approaches, the family
analogy is appropriate, even if it does not account ideally for all of the possible
ways that the two structures differ.
Third, I am not convinced that technologically focused regulation always or
even generally can account for the full range of needs displayed by these
families. Changing the paradigm to family-focused regulation means that any
new law must be analyzed based not just on its scientific justifications but also
on its implications for the interests of gamete providers, recipients and, most
importantly, donor offspring. Explicit reliance on the basic family law principle
of “best interests of the child” provides guidance in developing these new laws.
This principle justifies regulations to ensure gamete safety, but it also justifies
the broader regulations discussed below.
Part of the difficulty is that the argument that donor-conceived family net-
works are different employs a somewhat limited concept of what family law
covers. Families once linked by shared interdependencies and living space are
still subject to family law once they dissolve. Although the adult partners may
no longer be interdependent emotionally or financially, and although family
members may occupy different living spaces, child custody, visitation, and
support law continue to regulate family relationships. The image of the tradi-
tional family with married parents and children living in the same home is
deeply ingrained, but modern families have rendered this image somewhat
270. For a discussion of these remedies, see, for example, Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their
Will? Toward a Pluralist Recognition of Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565 (2009).
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outdated. Forty percent of children are born outside of a marital family, and the
divorce rate hovers around forty percent.271 Contemporary families no longer
look like traditional families and, as discussed earlier, the different strands of
the family as domesticity critique help point towards future applications of
family law. As a result, basic principles of family law are of some utility here.
I do not mean to dismiss the concerns about the types of differences between
family networks and families. These are very real concerns and should be taken
very seriously in crafting new approaches. But donor-conceived family commu-
nities exhibit many of the bonds of affinity that have characterized family, and
there are shared consanguineous bonds as well. Concerns of the total transfer of
family law into family networks should help structure which existing laws
should be applicable.
2. But What About Donors?
A second objection to the approach developed in this Article of according
more rights to donor-conceived families and communities is that it will affect
the supply of donors.272 More specifically, some have argued that, without a
guarantee of anonymity, donor supply will decrease dramatically, and the
United States will be forced to recruit new donors internationally. This then
potentially implicates procreative rights, which are, on this argument, constitu-
tionally protected.273 Decreases in the supply of donors limit options for
reproduction.
Some evidence exists that, when countries have required identity disclosure,
donors are less likely to come forward.274 If gamete providers know that they
can be found, the argument goes, then they may be less likely to give gametic
material out of fear that an unknown child will come knocking on their door
twenty years later, while current practices appear to protect their ongoing
anonymity. There are, of course, numerous objections to allowing for limited
disclosure. Gaia Bernstein eloquently connects disclosure to a decreasing sup-
271. See, e.g., CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 45 (discussing changes in the American family and
calculation of the divorce rate).
272. The primary goal of this Article is to map and begin to develop a legal framework for
donor-created family communities. Arguments about affecting the supply of donors are secondary to
this goal, and are instead concerned primarily with how ending donor anonymity would affect supply.
See I. Glenn Cohen, Rethinking Sperm Donor Anonymity: Of Changed Selves, Nonidentity, and One-
Night Stands, 100 GEO L.J. 431 (2012). Indeed, one can easily imagine developing new legal
frameworks for donor-created family communities based on a voluntary disclosure system that did not
mandate identity release. Nonetheless, given the intertwined nature of these issues, this section briefly
addresses concerns about the donor supply.
273. See Daar, supra note 12, at 51–54; Vanessa L. Pi, Note, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why
Requiring Exposed Donation is Not the Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 379, 380–81, 395
(2009); Sivinski, supra note 231, at 908–09. See generally John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction,
Choosing Genes, and the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490 (2008)
(evaluating reproductive freedoms in the context of ART).
274. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1207–13.
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ply of donor gametes.275 Indeed, most observers agree that mandatory disclo-
sure has at least some effect on supply, although disagreement arises on the
precise impact.276 Many banks have developed new recruiting practices in order
to increase their supplies.
A variety of countries, including Sweden, Switzerland, and the United King-
dom, have abolished anonymity and have experienced consequent shortages
also due to restrictions on payment.277 Studies have repeatedly shown that about
half of both egg and sperm donors would not participate if anonymity were
removed—but that the other half would continue to provide gametes.278 Early
studies from countries that have moved towards mandatory donor identification
similarly showed that donors were less willing to provide gametes if they knew
their identity would be disclosed.279 Even the future possibility that a law will
require such disclosure may have a dampening effect.280 Indeed, after Sweden
enacted legislation in 1985, which mandated the identification of gamete provid-
ers when the child reached the age of eighteen, there was some concern that the
legislation had caused a severe decline in the number of sperm donors.281 In the
quarter-century since then, however, there appears to be an increase in the
number of sperm providers, and fears that donor-identity release requirements
would inhibit semen provision have been allayed.282 In England, commentators
raised similar concern over decreasing numbers of donors once national law
precluded anonymous donation in April 2005, but the actual situation is more
complicated. The number of men providing sperm and women providing eggs
in Britain dipped during the first few years after anonymity ended, but is
steadily increasing and is only about ten percent below its pre-abolition peak.283
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., Blyth & Frith, supra note 257, at 79–82; Neroli Sawyer, Who’s Keeping Count? The
Need for Regulation Is a Relative Matter, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1811, 1812 (2009).
277. See Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1207–13. Where payment is allowed, the sperm business
functions like other market commodities. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 59, at 61. Restricting anonym-
ity, but not payment, might affect both supply and demand, but would probably result in higher prices
for sperm.
278. See, e.g., Eric D. Blyth, Lucy Frith & Abigail Farrand, Is It Possible To Recruit Gamete Donors
Who Are Both Altruistic and Identifiable?, 84 FERTILITY & STERILITY S21 (2005).
279. See Ken Daniels & Othon Lalos, The Swedish Insemination Act and the Availability of Donors,
10 HUM. REPROD. 1871, 1872 (1995).
280. Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 6, at 541.
281. See, e.g., Daniels & Lalos, supra note 279, at 1871; A. Lalos, K. Daniels, C. Gottlieb & O.
Lalos, Recruitment and Motivation of Semen Providers in Sweden, 18 HUM. REPROD. 212, 212 (2003); F.
Shenfield, Privacy Versus Disclosure in Gamete Donation: A Clash of Interest, of Duties, or an
Exercise in Responsibility?, 14 J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 371, 371 (1997).
282. Daniels & Lalos, supra note 279, at 1872–73; Shenfield, supra note 281.
283. See New Donor Registrations, HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., http://www.hfea.gov.uk/
3411.html (last updated Mar. 23, 2011) (reporting on new sperm and egg donor registrations). Journalist
Liza Mundy observed, “there has not been a decline in registered sperm donors following the 2005
change, and it’s arguable that there is not a shortage of donor sperm now. The number of sperm donors
has risen in the UK since the identity-disclosure rule took effect.” Liza Mundy, Shortage? What
Shortage? How the Sperm Donor Debate Missed Its Mark, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 19, 2010, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/sep/19/sperm-donors-shortage-market-forces.
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Thus, while requiring the release of information may have some initial
impact on the number of donors, predictions of drastic long-term effects appear
overblown. Moreover, such legislation may result in the development of new
methods to recruit other donors; in Scotland, men were offered oats, the British
National Health Service has targeted sports fans,284 and the publicity associated
with new laws may encourage different types of donors to come forward.285 By
changing advertising techniques to emphasize helping others rather than the
amount of payment, sperm and egg banks may be able to recruit donors who
care less about money and more about facilitating the creation of families. As
one physician at a fertility center in England explained, “we need to change our
strategies to target older men in established relationships. Since it appears they
are likely to offer help for altruistic purposes, we must . . . increase public
knowledge of the need for donors up to the age of 40.”286 If open-identity
programs are mandated, then this will more likely attract men who are older
than the current pool of donors, who already have children, who believe that
donating sperm is an altruistic act, and who assume that open-identity programs
are appropriate. But payment, rather than anonymity, does seem to remain a
critical component; when Canada outlawed payment for sperm donors, the
sperm supply decreased dramatically.287
Even granting that there would likely be an impact on the number of donors,
this objection remains problematic. It fits nicely within a paradigm in which the
donor world is regulated as a scientific or medical area, but not within a family
law paradigm. As I explained earlier, recognizing relationships in addition to
medical needs should serve as the basis going forward. This objection provides
critical insights into tensions in the ART field. Unlike adoption, which has
explicitly focused on the child’s best interests, ART has developed to serve
(potential) parents’ interests in producing a child.288 And, as an industry has
flourished in this environment, it too has strong interests in serving these
potential parents. Donors supply a highly desirable commodity, and children are
the highly desired outcome. While birth mothers have helped produce changes
284. Kate Foster, Scots Giving Sperm . . . To Get Their Oats, DAILY STAR (Scottish ed.), March 19,
2010, at 22; Marie Woolf, Sperm Bank Asks Sports Fans To Lend a Hand, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Jan.
10, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article6982300.ece; see also Lucy Frith,
Eric Blyth & Abigail Farrand, UK Gamete Donors’ Reflections on the Removal of Anonymity:
Implications for Recruitment, 22 HUM. REPROD. 1675, 1677–78 (2007).
285. See, e.g., Ken Daniels, Anonymity and Openness and the Recruitment of Gamete Donors. Part
I: Semen Donors, 10 HUM. FERTILITY 151, 157 (2007); Frith, Blyth & Farrand, supra note 284.
286. Press Release, Sperm Donor Crisis—Researchers Find Sharp Fall Requires Urgent New
Recruitment Strategies (Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://www.oxfordjournals.org/eshre/press-release/
nov051.pdf (quoting Dr. Jane Stewart).
287. Sperm Donor Shortage Hits Canadian Fertility Clinics, CBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2006, 2:19 PM),
http://www.cbc.ca/health/story/2006/12/19/sperm-shortage.html.
288. See Debora L. Spar, As You Like It: Exploring the Limits of Parental Choice in Assisted
Reproduction, 27 LAW & INEQ. 481, 491 (2009) (noting that adoption requires some entity to “deem[]
that the parent is fit and that the proposed adoption is in the best interests of the child. . . . The
underlying principle, however, could easily be extended into the realm of assisted reproduction . . . .”).
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in the adoption world, including somewhat more control for them, there is little
such advocacy in the donor world.
The needs of infertile couples—regardless of whether the infertility is medi-
cal or social289—are complex, not simply based on the need for medical
services or consumer protection. Many of them now search for donors willing to
be identified in the future, many of them rue that they opted for anonymous
donors, and many of them are aware that their children may want additional
information about the donors.290
A more philosophical objection to a change in the nature of donors is raised
by Professor Glenn Cohen.291 He argues that any alteration of when, whether, or
with whom we reproduce cannot necessarily be justified based on a focus on
any resulting child’s best interests.292 Indeed, he finds most justifications of the
regulation of reproduction to be “either implausible or unsettling.”293
There are numerous responses to this philosophical concern.294 First, rather
than focus on the “resulting child,” the approach criticized by Professor Cohen,
we should focus on the rights of a child who actually comes into existence.295
At that point, the test should not be: would this child have been better off not
being born? Instead, as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have emphasized,
there is a responsibility to maximize human capabilities.296 The capabilities
289. See Daar, supra note 12, at 23–24 (discussing “functional” and “structural” infertility).
290. As a board member of the Donor Sibling Registry, I am frequently privy to conversations
involving precisely these issues. The Donor Sibling Registry’s Yahoo! discussion group provides a
forum for such discussions (conversations on file with author).
291. See Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 245; I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment,
the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347 (2008); Cohen, Regulating
Reproduction, supra note 245.
292. As he explains:
Whenever the proposed intervention will itself determine whether a particular child will come
into existence, best interest arguments premised on that child’s welfare are problematic.
This point is at the core of the “Non-Identity Problem” developed by Derek Parfit . . . . The
punchline of the problem is that we cannot be said to harm children by creating them as long
as we do not give them a life not worth living[, which is sometimes also referred to as ‘a life
worth not living’]. A life not worth living is a life so full of pain and suffering and so devoid
of anything good that the individual would prefer never to have come into existence. As I have
demonstrated [elsewhere], this insight renders problematic any attempt to use BIRC [Best
Interests of the Resulting Child] type reasons to justify a regulation of reproduction that will
alter when, whether, or with whom individuals reproduce—such a regulation cannot be said to
be in the best interests of the resulting child because a different child will result.
Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 245, draft at 14–15 & n.62 (footnotes omitted).
293. Id. draft at 3.
294. Indeed, Professor Cohen considers some of these objections. Cohen, supra note 272, at 433–39.
295. See Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 245, draft at 3 (“[T]he protection of the best
interests of existing children serves as a powerful organizing principle that justifies state intervention.”).
296. See AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 30–31 (1982); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOP-
MENT AS FREEDOM 144 (First Edition Books 2000) (1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Capabilities,
Female Human Beings, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 61,
82–83 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995); see also Maxine Eichner, Dependency
and the Liberal Polity: On Martha Fineman’s The Autonomy Myth, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1285, 1316
(2005) (book review) (“The state’s responsibility to protect the well-being of dependents has a special
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approach emphasizes the freedom of individuals to achieve the life that they
would choose for themselves. As elaborated by Nussbaum, the capabilities
include, “being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to
that of others.”297 While that statement is quite broad, many donor-conceived
offspring seek the same opportunity as others to know their biological heritage.
Or, to put it more bluntly:
To those who suggest donor offspring should shut up and be grateful because
without this intervention they wouldn’t “be here,” I say this: Ever had an issue
with your mom? Your dad? Whoops, sorry, you can’t talk about that! Without
them, after all, you wouldn’t exist.
Sure, we should all be grateful to be alive . . . . But donor offspring do not
more than any one else among us owe a lifelong debt of gratitude to their
bio/legal/social/donor parents simply for the opportunity to be alive.298
Cohen considers an argument that sperm donor anonymity is different from
the other examples of reproductive regulation: intending parents can fix the
“harm” they have done by providing the child access to the sperm donor’s
anonymity after the fact of conception.299 This approach, Cohen argues, will not
work to ground a legally enforceable right, because it is “likely to alter donor
and recipient behavior relating to when, whether, or with whom they reproduce.
Thus, a legally enforceable ‘catch-up’ obligation ‘feeds back’ into the concep-
tion decision and thus is not immunized from the Non-Identity Problem.”300
The issue, however, once the child comes into being, is how to maximize the
child’s welfare; prospectively, at least, any donor who provides gametes will be
aware of responsibilities to children created from those gametes.
Second, a child who does not yet exist is not harmed through its nonexis-
tence.301 That is, a nonexisting child has no rights to be born or not.302 We may
corollary when it comes to children: an intrinsic part of ensuring their well-being involves ensuring that
they have adequate conditions to develop their basic capabilities.”).
297. Martha Nussbaum, Human Rights and Human Capabilities, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 21, 23
(2007).
298. Elizabeth Marquardt, On Gratitude for One’s Existence, FAMILYSCHOLARS.ORG (May 22, 2010,
12:50 AM), http://familyscholars.org/2010/05/22/on-gratitude-for-ones-existence/.
299. Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 245, draft at 29–30 n.144 (addressing this in his
discussion of the “Last Judgment Strategy”).
300. Id.
301. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of
Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 119–20 (1999).
302. While the corollary—that no one is harmed if they are brought into existence with a life worth
living—is also true, see Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 245, draft at 10, this returns us to
the first argument of how to maximize the lives of people, including children, parents, and donors,
currently in existence. The comparison, once they are living, is not with nonexistence, but with others
who are living. See, e.g., Pratten v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), 2011 BCSC 656 (Can. B.C. Sup.
Ct.), available at http://www.cbc.ca/bc/news/bc-110519-pratten-sperm-donor-ruling.pdf (striking down
distinction between donor-conceived and adoptees with respect to knowledge of their genetic back-
ground).
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believe that any barrier to the existence of a particular child is morally problem-
atic, and that the barrier cannot be justified. At its extreme, this argument means
not only that abortion but also birth control and male masturbation should be
banned because each prevents the creation of certain children. More than ninety
percent of United States women will use contraception at some point in their
lives, and even the Catholic Church permits the rhythm method.303 We thus
must allow for some regulations impeding the existence of a child, and the
question then becomes which ones we, as a culture, will choose to impose, and
why and how we decide which regulations are appropriate. Abortion rights and
the ability to use birth control are about empowering parental choice as to under
what circumstances they will conceive. While any regulation requiring the use
of an anonymous donor restricts rather than broadens parental choice, the
fundamental concept of allowing some potential children not to come into
existence remains comparable. Moreover, nondiscriminatory regulations on the
types of contraceptive options available can be compared to nondiscriminatory
regulations on the types of assisted reproductive technology available.304
As a constitutional matter, the parameters of a procreative right concerning
assisted reproduction are less than clear.305 While rights to adult sexual intimacy
and to bear and rear children are protected, these may—or may not—include the
ability to use assisted reproductive technology.306 Even if they do, and the right
to use reproductive technology is protected as fundamental, there may well be
compelling state interests in promulgating certain narrowly tailored regulations.
Consequently, the existence of a procreative right provides only the starting
point for determining whether restrictions may be constitutional, and further
analysis becomes necessary. A more pragmatic objection is that any type of
restriction is the beginning of a slippery slope towards regulating not just what
gametes are available but who has access to those gametes.307 In light of
American politics, this is a legitimate fear, but, particularly in light of the strong
303. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, USE OF
CONTRACEPTION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1982–2008, at 5 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/
sr23_029.pdf; R.E.J. Ryder, “Natural Family Planning”: Effective Birth Control Supported by the
Catholic Church, 307 BRIT. MED. J. 723, 723 (1993).
304. The restrictions do not have a disproportionate impact on any protected group.
305. Indeed, the parameters of the right to procreation are less than clear. See, e.g., Ariela R. Dubler,
Essay, Sexing Skinner: History and the Politics of the Right to Marry, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1359
(2010) (suggesting how Skinner can be read as a case about “disentangling sex from reproduction and
the social anxieties raised by that separation”); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right To
Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 993–94 (2002) (describing ambiguity in Supreme Court jurisprudence on
procreational rights relating to reproductive technology); Sonia M. Suter, The “Repugnance” Lens of
Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories of Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive
Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1514, 1520–27 (2008); Elyse Whitney Grant, Note, Assessing the
Constitutionality of Reproductive Technologies Regulation: A Bioethical Approach, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
997 (2010).
306. See Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457 (2008); Fox, supra note 6, at 1882. But see John A. Robertson, Liberty,
Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1371, 1441 (1998).
307. See, e.g., Ertman, supra note 57, at 30–32.
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social and financial interests supporting procreative freedom, this should ulti-
mately be unjustified. In fact, the United Kingdom extended equality of treat-
ment to same-sex couples after it abolished anonymity. Moreover, it is entirely
unclear what actually causes a shift in norms in the infrastructure of donating. It
is no more possible to calculate whether a mix of regulations will reduce
childbearing in the long run than it is to tell whether stigmatizing nonmarital
births will do so. The result of the latter was younger marriage and more
children; the long-term effects of donor regulation may be impossible to predict.
Most fundamentally, however, what this Article proposes is shifting the terms
of discussion from “regulation of reproduction” to a focus on respect for
family-type interests. Protecting these interests, including limited disclosure of
the donor’s identity, should not be viewed as an attempt to regulate reproduc-
tion, but instead as a movement to respect the family. Any analysis of potential
connections between and within donor-conceived families and the donors should
be considered outside of a health, or technological, focus on regulating the
reproductive process.
Accordingly, a new paradigm for donor-conceived families considers not just
the child, but also the interests of donors, parents, the donor family network, or
the larger community. Some parental interests could be furthered through this
new paradigm, interests such as making contact with genetically related off-
spring and even the donor, ensuring the integrity of their own families, and
respecting their children’s interests. A focus only on regulation, rather than
relationships, also overlooks donors’ interests in becoming known and possibly
establishing connections with their offspring.308
Taken together, these arguments show the importance of focusing on the
interests of the existing child and her web of relationships and support. Ensuring
an adequate supply of donors is critical to a medical model of donor families,
but the issue is less germane once the relational concerns of family law become
a significant factor.
3. Privacy and Unwanted Contact
One man, who has been donating anonymously since 2004, said he was not
opposed to his 13 offspring contacting him when they were adults but wanted
“fair warning” before his phone number and address were handed out. “These
people are strangers so of course I would be concerned if they were given my
home number,” he said. “What if my own child was to answer the phone to
someone who said ‘hello, I’m your sister’. I think the privacy of my fiance´
308. This objection might be resolved by allowing intending parents and donors to choose an
open-identity option so that they retain the possibility of connection, by allowing a market in which
both disclosure and nondisclosure are available. This does not, however, protect existing children who
seek disclosure if they are born to parents who have opted against disclosure; it (somewhat paternalisti-
cally) denies that intent might change over time; and, critically, it suggests that, apart from perhaps a
child’s interests, there is no other conceivable state interest in mandating disclosure. My thanks to
Professor Cohen for helping me sharpen this argument.
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and prospective children should be protected considering I did this anony-
mously.”309
A third objection is that simply allowing for identifying information about the
donor and other genetic offspring will then result in unwanted contacts and
efforts to establish a relationship, violating the constitutionally protected pri-
vacy rights of all involved. The strongest version of this argument also suggests
that this will disrupt relationships in the donor-conceived families as well as in
the donor’s family. This argument predicts that offspring or their parents will
“force” themselves into other families where, for example, the offspring may
not even know they were donor-conceived, or the donor may never have told
her family about the potential existence of these children. Donors may be
reluctant to find out that they have helped conceive dozens of offspring, they
may be concerned about legal liability, or they may be worried about offspring
who are emotionally needy. They might claim that recognizing identity rights
could produce discord (regardless of whether there is an obligation to form a
relationship) because any attempted contact could invade the privacy of donors.
Indeed, the obligation to form a relationship aside, donor-conceived children or
parents could still force themselves into other families without any party
presuming the existence of an obligation to form such a relationship. Finally, as
a corollary, contact may feel threatening to the parents as they wonder about
“sharing” their child.310
The primary problem with this argument is that it conflates the right to
identity with the obligation to form a relationship. It also suggests a deep-seated
insecurity in the donor-conceived family between parent and child, an insecurity
which is unwarranted.311 Donor-conceived people could learn the identity of
their donors, or even the identity of donor-conceived offspring, yet there might
never be any contact. Laws permitting identity disclosure recognize the legiti-
mate interest in obtaining this information, but do not require contact or further
interaction by anyone involved; there are no mandated, legally recognized
relationships. Donor family networks depend on mutuality and reciprocity.312
Of course, while many families and donors will welcome the contact, some may
309. Kate Benson, Fertility Law Change Puts Spotlight on Donors, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Austl.), Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.smh.com.au/national/fertility-law-change-puts-spotlight-on-donors-
20090224-8guk.html.
310. See SHULER, supra note 96, at 6. This was an argument in the adoption context as well. See
HOWARD ET AL., supra note 248, at 17.
311. Studies have repeatedly found that the primary reason that donor-conceived people search for
their donors is curiosity, although many do also desire to form a relationship with the donor. See, e.g.,
Beeson et al., supra note 80, at 2420 tbl.4; see also Caroline Lorbach, Information Needed on Donor
Parents, TIMES-COLONIST (Can.), July 17, 2011, http://www.timescolonist.com/health/Information
neededdonorparents/5115569/story.html#ixzz1SfXyKoZW (mother of three donor-conceived chil-
dren observing that “[d]onor-conceived people are not looking for parents . . . . What they are looking
for is the missing pieces to complete their sense of self.”).
312. This is another aspect of their difference from other types of families; while you typically
choose your adult partner, you do not choose your children—or your parents.
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not want any kind of relationship. Even if they are under no legal obligation to
respond, donors may find the attempted contact would still be bothersome or
invasive. Consequently, it is critical to ensure the legal clarity of donor’s rights.
Allowing for limited identity disclosure does not become a basis for arguing
that donors have any legal obligations. Donors should have neither legal rights
nor duties in the absence of an enforceable contract providing otherwise.313
Claims that unwanted intrusions will result suggest that those interested in
searching will be unable to set limits. Indeed, when states have opened records
to adopted individuals, there have been few complaints about unwelcome
contacts.314 Some donors may be overwhelmed by the number of offspring they
have helped create, and respond only to the first twenty, but then stop. They are,
of course, under no legal obligation to respond to the remaining eighty.
Parents who have created families with donor gametes may not welcome
contact from half-siblings, and may feel threatened in their own parenting as
their offspring search. For example, parents who do not disclose the fact of
donation are often worried about the harm to their relationship with their
children, particularly between the child and the nonbiological parent.315 A
nonbiological parent may fear rejection if a child finds the genetically related
donor, or lesbian families may hesitate about reaching out to straight donors.
There are three responses. First, most contacts are positive.316 But second,
given the rate of technological change in the ability of genetic tracing, practices
of anonymity may simply collapse as science allows for increasingly accurate
genetic identifications.317 While these practical realities do not answer jurispru-
313. See Cahn, supra note 146, at 221–22.
314. MADELYN FREUNDLICH, EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., FOR THE RECORDS: RESTORING A
LEGAL RIGHT FOR ADULT ADOPTEES 18–19 (2007), http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications/
2007_11_For_Records.pdf; HOWARD ET AL., supra note 248, at 33–34. This is another example of how
the ART world can learn from the adoption world. See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 138.
315. See, e.g., MUNDY, supra note 38, at 183 (discussing fathers’ discomfort with telling child about
donor conception); Dorothy A. Greenfeld & Susan Caruso Klock, Disclosure Decisions Among Known
and Anonymous Oocyte Donation Recipients, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1565, 1567 (2004) (noting that
some women who chose anonymous donors did so to prevent the donor from interfering with their
parenting decisions); Susan Caruso Klock & Dorothy A. Greenfeld, Parents’ Knowledge About the
Donors and Their Attitudes Toward Disclosure in Oocyte Donation, 19 HUM. REPROD. 1575, 1578
(2004) (discussing parental concerns that child will become alienated from nongenetic parent); Dena
Shehab et al., How Parents Whose Children Have Been Conceived with Donor Gametes Make Their
Disclosure Decision: Contexts, Influences, and Couple Dynamics, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY 179,
182–83 (2008) (fear of disrupting relationship).
316. See supra text accompanying notes 93–97. This has certainly been true in the adoption context,
where similar fears have been expressed. See HOWARD ET AL., supra note 248, at 33–34. And, in
adoptions that have allowed contact between the birth parents and the adoptive family, there are few
regrets. E.g., Harold D. Grotevant et al., Many Faces of Openness in Adoption: Perspectives of Adopted
Adolescents and Their Parents, 10 ADOPTION Q. 79 (2008).
317. See, e.g., Alison Motluk, Anonymous Sperm Donor Traced on Internet, NEW SCIENTIST (Nov. 3,
2005), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg18825244.200; Alison Smith Squire, A Generation of
Sperm Donor Children Are Discovering the Father They Know and Love Is NOT Their Father at All,
DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-1163032/A-generation-
sperm-donor-children-discovering-father-know-love-NOT-father-all.html (writing that as a result of
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dential concerns about privacy, they do show the urgency of addressing the
jurisprudential issues. One solution, which would mirror the adoption world,
permits the filing of contact preference forms, so that a donor or donor-
conceived family could indicate no interest in contact.318 While difficult to
enforce outside of stalking laws, these forms would provide useful information
about the willingness of the gamete provider to engage with offspring. Those
receiving information might also be required to receive counseling319—
particularly important where a no-contact form is on file—to help them handle
their emotions.320
Finally, privacy is a relational concept. As we consider what will be dis-
closed, information must be considered in context, which means that “the
relationships in which the information is transferred and the ways in which it is
used become the central focus of inquiry.”321 Disclosure, then, is harmful when
information is disseminated beyond its intended audience, but the mere act of
disclosure is not intrinsically harmful.322 While retroactive release of identify-
ing information may raise privacy issues, future laws that establish parameters
for identity release in the donation process do not trigger these concerns.323
CONCLUSION
As these families come together, there is much uncharted territory on how to
define their connections. While existing doctrines provide some useful analo-
gies, they are incomplete models. This Article has explored how the law might
begin to nurture relationships, foster emotional connection, and recognize the
multiple forms of intrafamily relationships. It has suggested a paradigm shift,
regulating donor-conceived families communities not just as scientific and
DNA test, a woman found out she had two half-siblings, and ultimately was able to trace her sperm
donor); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, Essay, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and
Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2006) (describing forms of involuntary genetic testing).
318. For examples in the adoption context, see ALA. CODE § 22-9A-12(d) (LexisNexis 2006)
(contact preference form); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 2769(3) (Supp. 2010) (same); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-1-128 (2010) (availability of no-contact form). The forms typically provide the opportunity to
indicate a preference for contact, contact with an intermediary, or no contact.
319. The choice to require counseling as opposed to an opt-in system depends on governmental
priorities. Certainly, allowing recipients of information to choose counseling is a more flexible option,
but the state might decide that the impact of the information merits mandatory counseling. See Blyth &
Frith, supra note 243, at 181 (discussing various government-required forms of counseling).
320. Somewhat ironically, Monica Bowers and her wife chose not to use an identity-release donor
precisely because they “considered that contacting the donor could possibly be a traumatic experience
for our child. We can neither control nor predict the ID-Release donor’s reaction 18 years from now, if
our son were to contact him.” Monica Bowers, Cryobanks and Donor Anonymity, THE EXAMINER, Jan.
20, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/lgbt-parenting-in-national/cryobanks-and-donor-anonymity
#ixzz1SYrhV3OK.
321. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclo-
sure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1065 (2003).
322. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 532–35 (2006).
323. And, as discussed supra note 318 and accompanying text, the no-contact forms can provide
protection against unwanted communications.
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medical constructs but also as relational entities. Families connected through the
same donor, but who do not share dependencies or a home, may develop
emotional intimacies that resemble those of other familial structures. These
relationships transcend their origins, which may be rooted in commercial
transactions and medical cures. Family law will need to adapt existing doctrines
as it develops an approach to these families. The difficulty, as is the case
whenever existing laws must evolve to cover new situations, is determining
how to apply legal standards and institutions developed for other purposes.
This process of evolution must respect the particular characteristics of donor-
conceived familial relationships. This Article has suggested that the law adapt to
these new families in two basic ways. First, these relationships must find a
home within family law in addition to their current home within health law.
Second, the traditional focus in family law on relationships and on a child’s best
interests should replace the existing medicalized focus on patients’ interests in
the donor world. While the simple biological relationship should not necessarily
entitle members to privileges or state support of the relationships within tradi-
tional family law doctrine, it should entitle members to state regulation based on
fairness and other important goods at stake.
The law already provides a background to the development of donor-
conceived families; it does not provide adequate structure to answer the chal-
lenges raised by these families. As the number of families that owe their
existence to reproductive technology increases, the paradigm for regulation and
respect must be based on family law, which has historically regulated compa-
rable relationships. This Article provides a framework for conceptualizing how
family law and constitutional law can adapt to establish basic principles to
ensure the integrity of donor-conceived family networks. These principles have
even broader application, leading to changes in how we conceive families. The
kinds of reforms with respect to gamete donation will reinforce the open records
in adoption movement, and should help in the recognition of the equality of
collaboratively formed families of various kinds—adoptive families (both domes-
tic and transnational), donor gamete families, and surrogacy families, regardless
of their genetic relatedness. Ultimately, recognizing donor-conceived family
communities will promote a more nuanced understanding not only of the
meaning of family relationships, but will also challenge concepts of genetically-
based relationships. It can affirm the integrity and privacy of families, however
they are formed, while also recognizing the significance of understanding and
connecting to one’s genetic origins. Indeed, the paradigm shift in the donor
world could prompt broader changes more generally, creating options beyond
framing all families within the dyadic nuclear family model. Without diluting
parental responsibility, a new model can acknowledge pluralism of family
forms. The result would benefit those in all family forms, including hetero-
sexual, biologically formed ones.
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